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Software1 is a relatively new technology. The early software concepts are over a 
hundred years old, but the first significant computer programs were only written in the early 
1950’s. The software industry, as a separate industry, has been evolving since the mid- 
1980’s. A decade later, it had revenues that equalled the sale of hardware. Today, computer 
programs are one of the foundations of information industry, which, in turn, has become a 
major part of the world’s industry. Computers are an unavoidable part of our life. Software 
transactions are common in national and international markets. Increasingly businesses are 
becoming dependent upon the proper functioning of software programs. Home computer 
users, too, often depend upon software applications for personal record keeping, finances, 
communication, etc.. Where purchasers of software suffer damage and loss as a result of 
defects in the software - loss of records, consequential loss like staff-time lost rectifying the 
problem, meaning that productivity is adversely affected, loss of business, potential 
corruption of other parts of the computer system, loss occasioned by reliance on the 
defective software - they will certainly wish to seek redress. The form of redress depends 
upon within what legal regime software is dealt with. 
How then should software transactions be categorised? The legal community still 
struggles to fit them into existing legal structures. Software transactions usually consist of the 
transfer of a ready-to-install computer program in exchange for money. Where software 
proves defective, the buyer could always sue under general tortious liability. The most likely 
cause of action, however, would be to sue in contract, given that it is the norm in such 
relationships between the buyer and the seller to have a contract setting out the obligations 
of each party. The existing contract laws generally categorise software contracts as for the 
sale of goods. However it is doubtful if software itself can fit into this scheme. Software can 
be mass-produced and delivered on a disc or electronically, or custom designed for a 
particular party. Yet it is generally not sold, but the buyer only purchases a license, granting 
him the right to use the software. If software is characterised as a good, then a sales law 
solution seems to fit. If software is seen as an immaterial good, then a licence contract 
solution seems more adequate. These facilities challenge traditional values and practices, 
including those of contract law. 
The legal classification of software transactions is not simply of an academic nature. 
From the point of view of the purchaser it is advisable to characterise it as a tangible, 
                                                
1 Software constitutes a collective term, which describes everything that is not part of the hardware, hardware 
being all physical units of a data processor. Software is a set of instructions that control the hardware. Simplified, 
software consists of 1’s and 0’s in a sequence of any length, a so-called object code that controls the sending of 
electricity to the hardware (Ravicher, 5 Va. J. L. & Tech. (2000) 11 at 13). 
In this thesis I will interchangeably use the terms „computer program“, „computer software“, „program“ or 
simply „software“ to mean the same thing: instructions for a computer that are fixed in a tangible medium. Those 
instructions are used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result. The most common media 
of storage for software are computer discs, CD-Roms, and a computer’s hard drive. A hard drive is part of a 
computer’s internal memory.  
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movable thing, because then the transaction can be determined a sale with which he 
achieves absolute power of disposition. Hence consumer protection is an important issue. 
The seller, on the contrary, is interested to keep the rights in the software and therefore it is 
advisable to classify the transaction as a license agreement, not as a sale.  
The question whether software can be defined as a good, gains more significance as 
it is easily distributed over the Internet. Businesses and consumers from every country are 
using the Internet to conduct international transactions. The exchange via wire or satellite 
has even been defined as a second industrial revolution.2 While most legal systems now 
agree that software delivered on a disc can be categorised as a good, the electronic delivery 
imposes greater problems. Since it is commonly agreed that software in itself is not tangible, 
it is questionable if this kind of delivery fits into the contract law requirements. 
The globalisation of software transactions increases the need for a uniform 
interpretation of such contracts. It is essential that an item such as software that is so often 
subject to cross-border transactions is dealt with on a uniform basis. Currently, two revision 
processes are ongoing which are of particular interest for the creation of national and 
international rules regarding software transactions: the Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act, which implies a reform of Art. 2 UCC, and the revision of the German law of 
obligations in the Civil Code. Both revision processes drew comparisons to the Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. It is relevant to determine if these laws 
regulate software transactions sufficiently and to what extent they can help to develop new 
international laws. 
I will examine the treatment of software under the contract laws of the United States, 
Germany, and South Africa. Furthermore I will analyse the existing international uniform 
contract law, the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods. I will illustrate how 
the different legal structures are leading to legal uncertainty in software transactions. Some 
of the issues being considered include whether software should be treated the same, 
regardless of the mode of delivery, whether software can fit into existing legal concepts and 
whether there should be a new body of contract law for software, nationally and 
internationally. The analysis will be restricted to software transactions for the permanent use 
against single payment, as it is the common mode of transaction and poses the greatest 
difficulties. The focus will be on standard software. This term is used to describe computer 
programs manufactured as copies designed for a range of application for an unlimited 
number of users as opposed to custom designed software that is specifically designed for the 
needs of the customer.3
 
                                                
2 Diedrich, 8 Pace Int’l L Rev (1996), 303. 




There has been an intensive scholarly discussion in Germany since 1985 concerning 
the subsumation of software contracts under domestic law that has also found its way into 
judgments of the courts. German law is largely codified. The uniform Civil Code, the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)4, is the most important source of private law.5 Among other 
things it deals with the law of obligations, which is comprised of different regulations dealing 
with a diversity of contracts. In search of an adequate qualification of software transactions, 
one should make an effort to fit it into the existing contract types. If necessary, integration 
can be achieved by drawing analogies. If, however, such a classification proves impossible 
or if the remedies are inappropriate, new specialised laws might be needed. Some progress 
might be involved in the reform of the law of obligations6. The German revision of the law of 
obligations bears a significant impact on the German legal system, because it is the first 
revision in over 100 years of existence of the German Civil Code. Through the 
Schuldrechtsreform, several rules in the law of obligations are changed. Whether these 
changes are sufficient with regard to software transactions will be analysed carefully. 
 
I. APPLICABLE CONTRACT TYPE 
The BGB contains general and special law of obligations. The special part, contained 
in Book Two, Chapter Seven, deals with many types of different contracts. All contracts are 
classified by looking at the subject and the rights that arise from the contract.7 The most 
important one is the contract of sale (Kaufvertrag). Its rules are placed at the beginning of the 
special part.8 Then there are the contracts of donation, rent and lease, loan, and 
employment.9 If a thing is made to order, such as a building or a ship, this will constitute a 
contract for works and services (Werkvertrag).10 These special rules are supplemented by 
the rules in the general part of the law of obligations, Book Two, Chapter One-Six BGB. The 
major aim of a contract usually hints at the particular applicable rules. Practically all software 
transactions are called license contracts without distinguishing the applicable contract type. 
There is no such contract type as a “license contract” under German law. License is a term 
that derives from copyright and patent law. Through a license, the addressee acquires a right 
to use protected rights. The license does not identify the applicable law. A “license contract” 
                                                
4 Hereafter cited BGB. The BGB entered into force on 1 January 1900. 
5 Foster, p. 229. 
6 Schuldrechtsreform; the drafters‘ committee began its work in 1984. The reform of the law of obligations passed 
the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) on 11 Oct. 2001 and has been approved by the Upper House of 
Parliament (Bundesrat) on 9 Nov. 2001. It will be in force from 1 January 2002. 
7 Mincke, JurPC 1991, 932. 
8 § 433 ff. BGB. 
9 Schenkung, §§ 516 ff. BGB; Miete und Pacht, §§ 535 ff. BGB; Leihe und Darlehen, §§ 598 ff. BGB; Diestvertrag, 
§§ 611 ff. BGB. 
10 § 631 BGB. 
 3
4 
will always consist of a mixture of contract types.11 Therefore the transactions have to be 
placed within the existing rules for other contract types. The applicable contract is 
determined by interpreting the intentions of the parties and their obligations under the 
contract.12 If the intentions of the parties do not clearly hint at a contract type, one must take 
into account both their interests and balance them against each other to find a proper 
contract type.13
 
1. Identity of software 
In order to subsume software transactions under one of the existing contract types, it 
is necessary to determine the identity of software. Several provisions, such as the provisions 
on sale and rent, require a thing as object of the transaction. The question is whether 
software can be classified as a thing. 
There is no absolute consensus on the identity of software in the German legal 
community. The issue is discussed in relation to the law of sales14. The characterisation as a 
sale requires that the object of the sale is a thing or a right.15 The problem is whether 
software constitutes a thing. A thing is defined as a corporeal object in § 90 BGB. It must be 
physically distinguishable.16 Corporeal objects include a whole range of movables and 
land.17 However the § 90 BGB definition of things is not applied very strictly in the context of 
the law of obligations. It is established that a thing sold could also be electricity, heat, know-
how and the chance of winning a lottery.18  
 
a) Software as a movable 
The German Federal Supreme Court (BGH)19 in 1987 made a first attempt to 
categorise software contracts. After considering the declarations of the parties the BGH 
came to the conclusion that they contracted for a sale and that the applicable remedies were 
appropriate. However, the court was rather reserved towards a definition of software. It 
declared that software is a movable as long as it is embodied on a data carrier.20 The court 
obviously circumvented the problem of defining the nature of software in general, but 
approached the question of whether a software transaction is a sale from the legal 
consequences level. In the following decision, it stated that it is not decisive whether software 
is sold on a data carrier or whether it is received otherwise. Software could simply be copied 
                                                
11 Palandt-Heinrichs, vor § 305, n. 12 
12 Palandt-Putzo, Überbl. § 433, n. 3. 
13 Palandt-Heinrichs, § 157, n. 1. 
14 § 433 ff. BGB; If the sale is a commercial one, then the provisions in the Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)), §§ 373 ff., will also apply. 
15 The differentiation to a sale of rights will be discussed later under B.3.c). 
16 Palandt-Heinrichs, § 90 n. 1. 
17 Palandt-Heinrichs, Überrbl. v. § 90, n. 3; Horn/Kötz/Leser, p. 120; Ebke/Finkin, p. 227. 
18 MK-Westermann, § 433, n. 2; Palandt-Putzo, § 433, n. 5; Horn/Kötz/Leser, p. 120; Robbers, p. 232. 
19 Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter cited BGH. 
20 BGHZ 102, 135 at 140. 
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onto the hardware so the buyer does not receive a disc with the program. The BGH argued 
that, in the end, there will always be a movable in the form of a copy on the hard-drive of the 
computer.21  
Once this rule was established, the lower courts followed it.22 The BGH itself upheld 
its decision in its later judgments.23 The court again had trouble defining software as movable 
or immovable. It therefore decided that the software transactions ruled upon were closer 
connected to sales law than to the law of contracts for works and services and that its 
remedies were appropriate for the sale of software. Thereby the court used the legal 
consequence approach again in order to suit the interests of both parties. 
Scholarly authors are also debating whether software is a movable or not. The 
majority of authors agree to treat software as a movable.24 Although some do not regard 
software as a “normal” movable thing, because it is only a set of ideas that are not touchable, 
they want to treat it as if it is.25 They agree with the BGH by arguing that software can always 
be seen as a movable good because it needs to be fixed on a hard-drive or a disc. It cannot 
exist by itself.26 To illustrate this it is often compared to books27, CD’s, or video tapes28, 
which are commonly accepted as things.29 The content of a book, which constitutes the 
ideas of the author, needs to be printed on paper to become existent and to make the ideas 
accessible to everyone. Similar to that, software is only able to exercise a particular control 
function if it is embodied somewhere. The comparison to books is problematic, as software is 
not attached to the medium because it can be copied from the disc and the disc can be 
erased. But the comparison to CD´s and video tapes is logical, as these are not necessarily 
attached to the medium either. However a computer program is not only played, but 
processes data and therefore does something on its own. 
Another argument follows the economic point of view by asking for the thing that is 
the object of the transaction. The object of trade is unquestionably the software and not the 
data carrier. Computer software can easily be treated as any other object of trade. Therefore 
the software must be considered a “thing”.30  It is pointed out that software should not be 
                                                
21 BGHZ 109, 97 at 100. 
22 OLG Stuttgart, NJW 1989, 2635; LG Köln, CR 1996, 154; OLG Köln, VersR 1993, 1532; OLG Celle NJW-RR 
1993, 432; OLG Celle, NJW-RR 1995, 941; LG Nürnberg-Fürth, CR 1992, 336 at 338; OLG Köln, NJW 1991, 
2155; OLG Hamm, NJW 1991, 2155; OLG München, CR 1993, 367; LG München, CR 1993, 367; AG Ansbach, 
CR 1995, 287; OLG Karlsruhe, NJW 1996, 201. 
23 BGH, NJW 1990, 3011; BGH, NJW 1991, 1231; BGH, NJW 1993, 461; BGH, NJW 1993, 2436; BGH, NJW 
2000, 1415. 
24 König, n. 254; König, NJW 1993, 3121; Hoeren, n. 74 ff.; Marly, fn. 107; Marly, BB 1991, 432 ff.; Taeger, CR 
1996, 257; Voß, p. 65; Martinek, JurPC 1993, 2263; Bartsch, CR 1992, 393 at 395; Müglich, p. 131; Palandt-
Putzo, § 433, n. 5; § 535, n. 2. 
25 MK-Westermann, § 433, n. 20. 
26 König, NJW 1989, 2604 at 2605; MK-Soergel, § 631, n. 80. 
27 König, n. 357 ff.; Marly, n. 96. 
28 Hoeren, n. 77 f.; Malzer, p. 83; BGH, GRUR 1989, 417 at 419. 
29 Palandt-Putzo, § 433, n. 1; OLG Stuttgart, NJW 1989, 2635 f.. 
30 Marly, n. 97. 
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treated differently based on the means of delivery.31 It cannot be defined as a movable as 
long as it is transferred with a data carrier and then as an immovable when there is no data 
carrier.  
In the event that software is delivered electronically, embodiment necessarily takes 
place when the software has been loaded on the computer hardware. The delivery is only a 
technically minor transition, so that this type of delivery is to be treated the same as delivery 
on a data carrier. The means of delivery have been changed due to the technical progress in 
data transactions. This does not impose the need for a different legal qualification.32 Such a 
view also corresponds with the layman’s view. The purchaser of the program perceives and 
controls it in embodied form on his computer and therefore sees it as a thing.33
Only some authors want to make an exception for software that is transferred via data 
transmission. They do not see software as movable in this kind of delivery.34
 
b) Software as an immovable 
Different to the BGH, the German Supreme Court of Finance35 established that 
software is immovable in its decisions concerning the fiscal definition of software.36 The court 
decided that standard software and customised software are both immaterial economic 
goods. The decisive aspect in a software transaction is the interest of the buyer, who wants 
to gain the legal and commercial power to use the program as a product with intellectual 
content for his business use. The ownership of the data carrier is unimportant, because it is 
not the primary aim of the sale. 
Some commentators also define software as immovable.37 Though they do accept 
that software embodied on a data carrier achieves the quality of a thing, they do not see 
software itself as a movable. The main point of the dispute is therefore if software constitutes 
a thing even though it is delivered via data transmission. They argue that computer programs 
are immaterial ideas38, and that the fixation on a data carrier is not necessary for a 
transaction. Some argue that a computer program is not a thing, but a language as described 
in § 2 Par.1 No.1 UrhG39.40 Others take literature as an argument and express the view that 
it is not movable because of its embodiment as a book, but that the content must be seen 
                                                
31 Endler,/Daub, CR 1993, 603; Marly, , n. 95. 
32 Marly, n. 101; König, NJW 1989, 2604 f.. 
33 Palandt-Heinrichs, § 90, n. 1. 
34 Hoeren, n. 75, 361; Topel, CR 1993, 198 f.; Ulbricht, CR 1990, 603; see also EuGH, NJW 1980, 2010 f.. 
35 Bundesfinanzhof, hereafter cited BFH. 
36 CR 1987, 576; CR 1992, 332; CR 1997, 19. 
37 Redecker, NJW 1992, 1739; Junker, NJW 1993, 824; Müller-Hengstenberg, NJW 1994, 3128; Moritz, CR 1994, 
257; Dörner, Jura 1993, 578; Kort, DB 1994, 1505; Heussen, GRUR 1987, 779; Schneider, CR 1994, 385; 
Köhler/Fritzsche in Lehmann, p. 516, n. 4; Haberstrumpf in Lehmann, p. 69, n. 1; Pres, p. 19; Pres, CR 1994, 
520; Ruppelt, p. 11; Bormann/Bormann, DB 1991, 2642. 
38 Heussen, GRUR 1987, 779 at 781; Müller-Hengstenberg, NJW 1994, 3128 at 3130; Dörner, Jura 1993, 578; 
Moritz/Tybussek, n. 751; Moritz, CR 1994 263; Ruppelt, p. 17. 
39 Urhebergesetz (copyright law), hereafter cited UrhG. 
40 Heymann, CR 1990, 112. 
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solitary. When software is transferred, the delivery is the important factor and not the 
embodiment on a data carrier. 41 Furthermore the natural definition of “things”, as seen by a 




There are a lot of arguments that are put forth and against software as a movable. It 
is obvious that, in the end, all views take into account the layman’s view, saying that it would 
support either characterisation. Hence the most important question is whether software can 
be seen as a movable from the point of view of a layman. The characterisation as an 
immovable seems to derive from seeing it as an “artificial intelligence”. But nowadays 
computer programs are daily items of practical use that are commonly available, so it does 
not fit a layman’s view to see it as “artificial intelligence”. Software can be technically 
controlled, even though it might not be embodied on a data carrier, i.e. it is not tangible. But 
the fact is that computer software is never tangible in the sense that a person could touch the 
program. Even if software is embodied on a disc, or on a computer, it is always only 
perceivable through a technical process. 
In conclusion it cannot definitely be said how a layman would define software. It 
varies due to the different subjective interpretations of software. Since it is not possible to 
make a final decision on whether software constitutes a thing, it is necessary to go one step 
further. In order to decide upon the legal qualification of software one must look at the 
possible contract types and their legal consequences. As to the complex views regarding 
software, it is subsumed under sales law as well as the law for contracts for works and 
services and several mixed contract types. 
 
2. Contract of Sale 
The characterisation of a sale not only requires a thing, but also a “sales transaction”. 
Typically a thing is transferred by for the permanent use against single payment of the price. 
In the beginning the courts decided that the law of sale was applicable in analogy43, because 
they saw software as being analogous to a thing. Later they used a direct approach.44 Some 
of the commentators that consider software as a movable propose to apply the §§ 433 ff. 
BGB in analogy45, others support a direct application46. Whichever way sales law is applied, 
                                                
41 Redecker, NJW 1992, 1739; Ulbricht, CR 1990, 603. 
42 Fritsche, JuS 1995, 497 at 498. 
43 BGHZ 102, 135 ff.; BGH, NJW 1990, 3011. 
44 OLG Hamm, CR 1995, 341; OLG Köln, CR 1997, 213 f.; OLG Hamburg, CR 1997, 87; OLG Köln, CR 1996, 
406. 
45 Busse, CR 1996, 389 at 390; Kort, DB 1994, 1505 f.; Fritsche, JuS 1995, 499; Zahrnt, NJW 1996, 1798 at 
1800; Zahrnt, Chapter. 8.1.1(3.6). 
46 Marly, n. 163; König, NJW 1993, 3124; Bartsch, CR 1992, 395; Hoeren, n. 143; v. Ohlen, p. 137. 
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it does not alter the legal consequences. 
If, however, other obligations come into play, such as the installation, adaptation, and  
the change of parameters of software, the transaction does not fit neatly under the definition 
of a sale. It is argued that the law of contracts for works and services is more appropriate 
considering the character of such a performance as well as the interests of the parties.47 It is 
important to mention that the BGH always had to decide only upon the simple transaction of 
standard software and not upon contracts that implied the installation, adaptation or change 
of parameter of software. Instead, it had to be decided by the lower courts, to what extent 
contracts implying the installation etc. are sales contracts.48
 
3. Contract for Works and Services49 
The rules for contracts for works and services (Werkvertrag) are laid down in §§ 631 
ff. BGB. A contract for works and services requires that the contractor promises to produce a 
certain result.50 It is distinguished from a contract of sale by determining if the contract is 
dominated by the transfer, or the production of a good.51  
The rules for contracts for works and services are unanimously applied for software 
that has been customised.52 Custom designed software comprises all computer programs 
that are specially designed and programmed for the particular needs of the buyer.  
The classification of standard software is not as clear. As was described above 
standard software transactions will often include installation and training. The question 
whether such contracts constitutes a sale or a work or a mixture of both is to be answered by 
determining the major duty of the contract. In cases where the service constitutes the major 
part, the law of contracts for works and services applies to the whole contract.53 Hence, the 
more difficult and important the work element is for the whole contract, the more likely it is a 
                                                
47 Saenger, NJW 1997, 1945; Jaeger, NJW 1999, 1294 at 1297; Müller-Hengstenberg, CR 1997, 613; Schneider, 
Chapter D, n. 312; Müller-Hengstenberg, NJW 2000, 3545 at 3546. 
48 This will be discussed in the next paragraph under „Contract for Works and Services“. 
49 The question whether software should be classified as goods or as services under European Law has still not 
been answered definitely. It has been stated in the European Parliament that software is a product for the 
purposes of the 1985 Product Liability Directive. However, the EU E-Commerce Directive, which addresses 
consumer protection issues, treats electronic deliveries as a service (Art. 2). The Directive will be implemented 
into German Law by the beginning of 2002. Electronic software would also fall under this definition. Yet, the 
Directive does not serve as a uniform body of contract law for electronic software. It is more focused on protecting 
and providing information to the end user than establishing rules for contract law. It depends on the development 
of contract law in each Member State to determine the treatment of electronic software in each of them.  
The delivery of software on a disc would not be considered a service. It is left to the Member States to 
decide upon the applicable rules. Since Germany generally treats software as a good, the Directive is not likely to 
have much impact on the general treatment of software. 
50 Palandt-Putzo, Einf. v. § 631, n. 1; Ebke/Finkin, p. 194 
51 Palandt-Putzo. Einf. v. § 631, n. 5. 
52 BGH, NJW 1990, 3008; BGH, NJW 1991, 2135; BGHZ 102, 135 at 141; BGH, CR 1986, 799 at 800; BGH, 
NJW 1996, 1745 f.; BGH, CR 1993, 681; OLG Celle, CR 1991, 219; Engel, BB 1985, 1159 at 1161; Koch, n. 555; 
Lutz, GRUR 1976, 331 at 334, Bartl, CR 1985, 13 ff.; Mehrings, NJW 1986, 1904; Marly, n. 46, fn. 88; Hoeren, n. 
8; Brandi-Dohrn, p. 1; Palandt-Thomas, Einf. v. § 631, n. 12; MK-Soergel, § 631, n. 80. 
53 OLG Düsseldorf, BB 1989, Beilage 5, siehe fn. 23, Zahrnt, NJW 1996, 1798 at 1800. 
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contract of works. Yet, often works are only collateral duties within the context of a sale.54
Some courts handle the issue of installation and training generously and mostly apply 
sales law.55 Others decided that the law of contracts for works and services is to be applied 
instead.56 The former ones found that in general the installation of the program is not 
sufficient to apply the law of contracts for works and services.57 The latter ones argued that if 
the installation requires special technical know-how or considerable amount of work, then it is 
a major service duty included in the contract of sale. In conclusion there are no universal 
rules. The determination always depends on the particular case.58  
Some commentators argue that all software transactions should be seen as contracts 
for works and services.59 They argue that the legal consequences of the contract of works 
and services are favourable as against the ones of a contract of sale. Different from sales 
law the remedies imply a right to cure.60 This would correspond with the interests of the 
parties, who would want to cure rather than repudiate the contract or reduce the price. Also, 
the limitation period only starts to run with the acceptance of the performance and not, as in 
sales law, with the delivery.61 In my view these arguments are not persuasive. Because of 
the many software developers there is a lot of competition in the market that forces everyone 
to develop better and better programs in a short time. Hence the buyers are likely to prefer to 
repudiate and buy a new program rather than have the “old” one repaired. The sellers would 
not want to cure either, for it is often more expensive than providing a new program. The 
different limitation period is not a good argument, either, as courts already take into account 
the special role of software and allow for a certain testing period before the limitation period 
starts to run. 
A valid argument for the characterisation as a service is that both customised and 
standard software would legally be treated the same. Yet a contract of works and services 
requires that the production of the software dominates the contract. In case of standard 
software, the programs are not individually produced for the customer, but for a range of 
customers, so this contract form is not applicable. 
 
4. “License Contracts” 
The ones that argue that software is immovable usually come to the conclusion that a 
software transaction constitutes some kind of “license contract”. 
                                                
54 MK-Westermann, vor § 433, n. 23. 
55 OLG Köln, NJW-RR 1993, 1140; OLG Köln, JurPC 1992, 607; OLG Köln, CR 1997, 213 f.; OLG Karlsruhe, 
NJW 1992, 1773; LG Baden-Baden, CR 1995, 399; Zahrnt, NJW 1996, 1800; Brandi-Dohrn, p. 3. 
56 OLG Karlsruhe, CR 1995, 397; OLG Köln, NJW-RR 1992, 1327. 
57 OLG Köln, CR 1997, 213 f.; LG Baden-Baden, CR 1995, 399; Zahrnt, NJW 1996, 1800; Palandt-Thomas, vor § 
631, n. 12. 
58 Marly, n. 51. 
59 Mincke, JurPC 1991, 932 at 938. 
60 § 633 BGB. 
61 § 640 BGB. 
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a) Know-how License Contract - Analogy to Lease or Sale 
Leading off from a decision by the BGH in 198162, some commentators still support 
the view that the transaction of software constitutes a license contract on the use of know-
how. They argue that the use of software is a use of know-how.63 A know-how contract is 
classified as a mixed contract for which some apply the rules of lease64, others the rules of 
sales in analogy.65 The remedies would underlie the general part of the law of obligation in 
§§ 323 ff. BGB.66  
Defects in the program would be treated as a positive Vertragsverletzung and fall 
under the 30-years limitation period, leaving the seller with an immense financial risk. Apart 
from these facts there are several other arguments against such a classification. Know-how 
contracts require that the knowledge behind the product is sold. But with the software the 
buyer only acquires a program that is able to process information. He does not get the 
knowledge of how the information is processed, so he does not buy the know-how. It has 
been argued that a delivery via data transmission constitutes the creation of a new thing.67 
But clearly the aim of the contract is not the creation of a new thing, but the transfer of an 
existing thing, the software program. One has to distinguish the work of the programmer and 
the copy that contains the results of the programmer’s ideas. The analogy to books and, in 
particular, CD’s and videos is plausible. Hence even modern forms of transfer such as data 
transmission or download do not conflict with a sales classification. 
Also, the buyer primarily wants the program to function, but is not interested in how it 
works. The transfer of the secrets of programming is not part of the contract. In my view, 
software transactions cannot be classified as know-how license contracts. 
 
b) License Contract Sui Generis  
Some state that it would be impossible to categorise software transactions under any 
of the existing contract regulations in the BGB and therefore support to defining them as 
contracts sui generis.68 They state the contract mainly aims at the transfer of a copyright 
license according to § 31 UrhG. The remedies depend on the particular case. This solution is 
not preferable, because it is not predictable what law the court will apply to the case. A 
contract sui generis fails to support legal clarity and certainty. 
 
 
                                                
62 BGH, BB 1981, 1856. 
63 Kilian, CR 1986, 187 at 193; Heussen, GRUR 1987, 779 at 787 ff.; Moritz/Tybussek, n. 531 ff. 
64 Pacht, §§ 581 ff. BGB. 
65 MK-Voelskow, § 581, n. 14; MK-Westermann, § 433, n. 2; Palandt-Putzo, § 433, n. 5; Mincke, JurPC 1991, 932 
at 935; Kilian, CR 1986, 187 at 193. 
66 Heussen, GRUR 1987 779 at 791. 
67 Goebel, DVR 1982, 155 at 160. 
68 Lauer, BB 1982, 1758 at 1759, 1763; Hackemann, CR 1986, 660 at 663. 
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c) Copyright License Contract – Sale of rights 
Others see the transaction as a transfer of user rights in the software.69 Rights can be 
objects of a sale according to § 433 BGB. They can be debts and other claims arising from 
obligations, mortgages, patents, trademarks, and shares in partnerships and companies.70 
The seller has the duty to vest the right in the buyer.71 Computer programs are explicitly 
excluded from patent law72, but they are copyrightable73. Copyrights in a program cannot be 
transferred, therefore a right in a program cannot be object of a sale.74 The originator of the 
program can transfer a license to use the program, though.75  
Often software contracts include several clauses by which the purchaser is limited in 
his right to use the program. It is argued that, if software transactions were treated as no 
more than contracts for the supply of goods or services, it would lead to an insufficient 
assessment of the nature of software licenses. It would leave out the intellectual property or 
information to which the license provides access. That is why software contracts should be 
seen as license contracts over a legally protected copyright to use an immaterial good in 
terms of § 31 UrhG.76 Some want to apply the remedies of lease or sale in analogy.77 Others 
apply, depending on the case, the general rules in §§ 325 ff. BGB or the law of sale, lease, or 
service.78
The classification of software as a sale of a right is problematic. Computer programs 
consist of a series of instructions that process information and then find a solution. This 
process is not protected by copyright. A person does not achieve the right in the 
processing.79 Furthermore it would not be practical to apply the different remedies depending 
on the case, for the remedies of the general part and sale and service differ. Software 
transactions need to be characterised unanimously so they all fall under the same rules. 
Traditionally copyright law has been regarded as a different branch of the law from 
that applicable to a sale. Copyright issues do not have an influence on the law of 
obligations.80 As was said earlier, a license gives a right to use, but does not identify the 
                                                
69 Kindermann, GRUR 1983, 150 at 152; Engel, BB 1985, 1159 at 1163; Müller-Hengstenberg, CR 1986, 441 and 
NJW 1994, 3133; Moritz, CR 1994, 257; Nordemann, CR 1996, 5; Brandi-Dohrn, CR 1986 63; OLG Stuttgart, CR 
1986, 639. 
70 Horn/Kötz/Leser, p. 120; Palandt-Putzo, § 433, n. 2. 
71 Horn/Kötz/Leser, p. 120. 
72 § 1 par.2 no.3 Patentgesetz (patent law), hereafter cited PatG. 
73 § 1 par.1 no.1 UrhG.  
74 Mincke, JurPC 1991, 932 at 934. 
75 § 31 par.1 UrhG. 
76 LG Lüneburg, NJW 1988, 2476; Nordemann, CR 1996, 5 at 6; Moritz, CR 1994, 257 at 261; Müller-
Hengstenberg, NJW 1994, 3133; Yet, the BGH once stated that software is not always protected by copyright, but 
only if the program exceeds the ability of an ordinary programmer (BGHZ 94, 276). Such a differentiation is not 
practical as it leaves open what quality a program must achieve to be copyrightable. Also it is unclear what the 
transaction would fall under if it is not protected by copyright. Later the BGH did not discuss the idea to classify 
software transactions as a sale of rights anymore. 
77 Moritz, CR 1994, 257 at 261; Nordemann, CR 1996, 5 at 8. 
78 Müller-Hengstenberg, NJW 1994, 3133. 
79 Mincke, JurPC 1991, 932 at 934. 
80 Müglich,  p.133 f.; Marly, n. 91. 
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applicable law.81 Therefore copyright issues are not constitutive for the legal interpretation of 
software contracts. The transfer of user rights is a necessity incorporated in the contract.82 If 
the software is transferred for the permanent use against single payment83, the buyer 
automatically achieves a right to use the copyrighted program according to § 31 par.2, § 69 d 
par.1 UrhG. This regulation constitutes an exception to the requirement to approve of actions 
in § 69 c UrhG. An approval is not necessary as long as actions are in accordance with their 
intended use. The granting of a right to use is not needed, because the transfer of a copy 
includes the right to use it.84 If the seller wants to limit the user rights, he can do so 
concerning utilisation and copying of the software.85 In conclusion the copyright protection of 
software does not conflict with the classification of software transactions into the law of sale. 
It is unnecessary to construe something like a copyright license contract. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Because of the aforementioned arguments, software transactions are to be 
subsumed under the law of sales. This is emphasised by the layman’s view. Laymen often 
usually speak of “buying” software, even though it is not sold in the traditional sense. 
Although, from an economic point of view, the license is an important part of the contract, 
because it restricts the user’s rights, users are not interested in what the license says. For 
them it is simply important that they are able to use the software, but not to what extent they 
are allowed to use it. 
Since copyrights do not alter ownership, there is no reason why the law of sales 
should not be applied to software contracts. Even those who see software as an immovable 
and want to apply license contract forms, often want to apply sales law remedies in analogy. 
Since it is possible to apply sales law to software in analogy, the regulation of a new contract 
form is not necessary. Still, it would be better to establish clear rules for software contracts, 
in order to lead to more certainty in the field. 
 
II. REFORM OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 
As was said earlier on, the reform of the law of obligations changes several rules in 
the law of obligations86. There is still no explicit rule concerning software contracts. However, 
the new rules for obligations not only address the sale of things and rights, but also the sale 
                                                
81 See C. I. 
82 Bartsch, CR 1992, 395; Pres, CR 1994, 520 at 521; Nordemann, CR 1996, 5 at 6; Lehmann, NJW 1993, 1822 
(1825). 
83 BGH, NJW 1988, 406; BGH, NJW 1993, 824; Brandi-Dohrn, CR 1993, 473. 
84 Zahrnt, NJW 1996, 1799; Zahrnt, CR 1994, 455 f.; Haberstrumpf in Lehmann, n. 121; Lehmann, NJW 1993, 
1822 at 1824; Lehmann, CR 1994, 277. 
85 Günther, JurPC 1994, 2488 at 2494. 
86 Chapter Two BGB. 
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of “other things”87. This is reasoned with the fact that the present rule did not imply all 
possible objects of a contract of sale. It is argued that the contract of sale is also suited for 
the permanent transfer of other assets against single payment. The new rule is intended to 
imply software.88 By doing so, the new law implements the existing case law, in which the 
rules of sales are already used concerning software transactions.89 Yet, since the new rules 
do not explicitly imply software, it is unclear whether the opponents of applying sales law to 
software transactions are easily convinced that it is now implemented into sales law. German 
courts are only bound by the law. Judges often consult commentaries and scholarly 
publications and take into account trade usage, i.e. customary law.90 Although courts should 
take into account the history of a law when applying its rules, the reasoning behind the new 
law does not impose a burden on the courts to classify all standard software contracts as 
sales contracts. Hence it remains to be seen how the courts are going to handle the issue in 
the future. 
 
III. TRANSFER AND PROCUREMENT OF OWNERSHIP 
A sales contract imposes obligations on the parties. According to § 433 BGB the 
seller must deliver the goods and transfer ownership in them, while the buyer must pay the 
price and take delivery of the goods. German law distinguishes between the law of 
obligations and the law of property. The contractual duties are to be seen strictly abstract 
from the transactions that fulfil them.91 Thus the conclusion of a valid contract does not 
cause ownership to pass.  
The transfer and procurement of ownership in movables is regulated in § 929 BGB. 
The buyer must achieve possession and the seller must lose possession in the sales object 
and both parties must agree on the passing of property.92 Possession is characterised by 
physical and not necessarily legal control over a thing.93 As long as one defines software 
itself as a movable, the transfer is not a problem. But if one sees software only as a movable 
in combination with a data carrier, the question of transfer is more problematic. In case the 
transfer takes place by electronic data transmission, the embodiment of the software takes 
place only when it is transferred onto the buyer’s computer-hardware.94 There never is a 
transfer of a movable thing from the seller to the buyer. Nevertheless the courts apply sales 
law. They reason that the transfer relies on extended technical possibilities, which do not 
                                                
87 § 435 par.1 BGB new. 
88 Reasoning of the Bundestag regarding § 433 BGB new, BT-Drucksache 14/6040, http://www.lrz-
muenchen.de/~lorenz/schumod/index.htm. 
89 Reasoning of the Bundestag regarding § 453 BGB new. 
90 Pauly, 19 J. L. & Com. 221 at 241 (2000). 
91 Horn/Kötz/Leser, p. 118; Fisher, p. 43; Ebke/Finkin, p. 192. 
92 Palandt-Bassenge, § 929, n. 9. 
93 § 854 BGB; Ebke/Finkin, p. 233. 
94 König, n. 715. 
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alter the legal nature of the contract.95 Some commentators argue similarly96, others apply 
sales law by interpreting the transfer and concluding that the requirement, that the seller 
must lose the possession in the thing by giving it to the buyer, is not essential.97 It is not 
necessary, because he never had possession in the concrete embodiment of the software 
copy on the computer of the buyer.98 The arguments are reasonable, so that possession is 
generally achieved regardless of the type of transfer. 
Ownership is defined in § 903 BGB. It means to be able to use an object as one likes 
and exclude others from influence.99 Yet, § 903 states that the owner’s freedom is limited 
through conflicting law and the rights of third parties.100 The question is whether licensing 
hinders the transfer of ownership so that the purchaser only achieves a copyrighted right of 
use as in § 31 UrhG. Because conflicting rights of third parties generally do not alter 
ownership101, the copyright protection of software does not result in the buyer not achieving 
ownership in the program.102 The transfer of the software and the procurement of ownership 
are fulfilled by granting an automatic right to use according to § 69 d par.1 UrhG. 
 
IV. LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE SOFTWARE ARISING FROM THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 
Under the current law, the special remedies for defects in §§ 459 ff. BGB apply to a 
contract of sale. If the software transaction is categorised as analogous to a contract of sale, 
the rules for defects apply in analogy, too. The remedies apply for breach of promise or 
warranty (Gewährleistungsrechte). Warranty signifies a reasonable standard of fitness. 
According to § 459 BGB the seller must provide an object that is free from material 
defects.103 A defect is defined as an unfavourable deviation from the normal quality of an 
object of the same type or from the specific purpose it was sold for.104 The defect must be 
considerable.105 It must be present in the thing at the time the risk passes, that is with the 
transfer of the object to the purchaser.106  
What then constitutes a software defect? Software is so complex that it is almost 
never without defects.107 If and how the software is working will often depend upon the 
hardware. A software engineer will never be able to foresee all defects that might occur. 
Since a defect must be considerable, it seems reasonable that not every limitation to the 
                                                
95 BGHZ 109, 97 at 100; AG Ansbach, CR 1995, 278. 
96 König, n. 715 ff.; Emmerich, p. 155. 
97 Hoeren, n. 363 f.; Busse, CR 1996, 389 at 390. 
98 Voß, p. 68 f.; Marly, n. 103. 
99 Ebke/Finkin, p. 238; Robbers, p. 263. 
100 Horn/Kötz/Leser, p. 172; Foster, p. 283. 
101 Palandt-Bassenge, § 903, n. 27; Marly, n. 165. 
102 Marly, n. 165; Taeger, CR 1996, 261; Voß, p. 79 f.. 
103 The seller is also liable for the conformity of the goods with any special warranty of certain qualities 
(“Zusicherung”) that were promised. These are cases of strict liability, § 459 par.2 BGB. 
104 Foster, p. 267; Palandt-Putzo, § 459, n. 8; MK-Westermann, § 459, n. 8; RGZ 135, 342; RGZ 161, 334; BGHZ 
452, 51. 
105 § 459 par.1 sent.2 BGB. 
106 § 446 BGB; Robbers, p. 233. 
107 Junker, n. 407; Moritz/Tybussek, n. 786. 
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functioning of the program can be defined as a defect. The leading cases established a 
formula according to which non-compatible parts of a program constitute a defect. Such 
defects arise when the software does not harmonise with the system108 or when it does not 
function on the hardware or with other installed programs.109  
The problem is, that §§ 459 ff. BGB do not give the right to cure. A right to cure 
describes the right to have a defect made good. The buyer to a sales contract can only 
chose to claim repudiation of the contract (Wandlung), i.e. avoidance, or reduction of the 
price (Minderung).110 He can claim damages if the seller has broken an express promise as 
to the characteristics of the goods or when the seller acted maliciously.111 Only in the case of 
generic goods the buyer can demand replacement of the software.112 Mere exaggerated 
praise of the goods like they are found in catalogues does not constitute a promise as to the 
characteristics of the goods.113
The lack of a possibility to cure is often considered too hard in relation to software 
contracts. The purchaser of a contract for works and services, in contrast, has a right to 
demand improved performance.114 Some courts and commentators support the application 
of these rights and duties to cure in advance to cancellation and reduction of the price.115 
The BGH explicitly left this issue open.116  
All these problems are solved by the implementation of the reform of the law of 
obligations. There will be no special rules for remedies regarding sales contracts anymore. 
Instead, they will underlie the general remedies in the general part of the BGB, which makes 
them easier to understand and apply.117 The liability of the seller is stricter. The object must 
be free of defects, which implies that the thing must have the qualities that the manufacturer 
promised in advertisements or labels.118 A separate warranty concerning the quality is not 
necessary. Since these laws are not specifically set up for software, it is still not clear when 
software is defective. It will still be determined by the formula developed by the courts.  
Most importantly, there will be a right to cure. 119 The buyer can decide between 
repair and delivery of a new thing.120 This should silence those who considered the law of 
contracts for services as the better alternative.121 In conclusion the remedies are drawn 
closer to the law of contracts for works and services. 
                                                
108 BGHZ 102, 135. 
109 OLG Saarbrücken, CR 1990, 713. 
110 § 462 BGB. 
111 § 463 BGB. 
112 § 480 BGB. 
113 Robbers, p. 233. 
114 § 633 par.2 BGB. 
115 LG Nürnberg-Fürth, CR 1992, 336; OLG Düsseldorf, CR 1990, 122 at 125; OLG Köln, CR 1992, 153; OLG 
Frankfurt, CR 1993, 217; Köhler/Fritsche in Lehmann, p. 553; Brandi-Dohrn, p. 37. 
116 BGHZ 102, 135. 
117 §§ 280 ff. BGB. 
118 § 434 par.1 BGB new. 
119 § 437 BGB new. 
120 § 439 par.1 BGB new. 




V. LIMITATIONS TO LIABILITY 
The seller can limit his liability by imposing limitations. These are generally contained 
in the standard terms of the contract.  
 
1. Content of Limitation 
Usually the seller limits his liability through the implementation of certain terms and 
conditions. According to § 2 AGBG122 standard terms and conditions only apply to a contract, 
if the seller notifies the buyer of the terms, if the buyer was able to take notice, and if the 
buyer agrees with the terms. If the standard terms only accompany the product, the 
notification is regarded as unusual, so they are not implemented.123 The standard terms must 
also be understandable, that is not in a foreign language.124
It is possible to limit or exclude warranties in the standard terms. However, limitations 
of warranties underlie the control through the AGBG. The AGBG allows only few 
limitations.125 It is not allowed to exclude remedies126, or to limit the remedies to a right to 
cure only127. But the seller can imply a right to cure in advance to the seller’s rights to 
repudiation and price reduction. Furthermore it is not allowed to limit the warranty period.128 
129 All in all it is very difficult to limit the liability, which implies a strong and necessary 
protection for consumers. 
 
2. Enforceability of Shrink-wrap Licenses 
Another difficult issue is the enforceability of imposed standard terms by way of so-
called shrink-wrap licenses. These agreements are often included inside pre-packed 
software packages and set forth the terms of the purchase or license of the software.130 A 
sticker on the outside shrink-wrap of the package notifies the purchaser that the use of the 
software is subject to these terms contained inside. Opening the cellophane paper 
constitutes acceptance. However, the customer does not see the terms until after purchasing 
the software and opening the package.131 The enforceability of such terms is debated. 
If the buyer purchases the software directly from the manufacturer, the license terms 
will constitute a part of the standard terms of the contract of sale. In most cases, though, the 
                                                
122 Gesetz der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (Statute for standard terms and conditions), hereafter cited 
AGBG. 
123 § 3 AGBG. 
124 Köhler/Fritsche in Lehmann, p. 538. 
125 Palandt-Heinrichs, AGBG § 9, n.4. 
126 § 11 No.10 a, No.11 AGBG. 
127 § 11 No.10 b AGBG. 
128 § 11 No.10 f AGBG. 
129 The aforesaid provisions are only applicable, if they are addressed to a consumer, § 24 par.1 AGBG. 
Restrictions toward non-consumers only underlie the general control rules in § 9 AGBG. 
130 Ravicher, 5 Va. J. L. & Tech. 11 at n. 40 (2000); Schneider, CR 1996, 657; Marly, n. 366. 
131 Schuhmacher, CR 2000, 641. 
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buyer purchases the software from a separate dealer. Then the license terms constitute the 
standard terms of a separate license contract between the manufacturer and the buyer. The 
license contract exists next to the contract between the dealer and the buyer. In this case, 
the buyer needs to accept the second contract. The problem is that the buyer usually only 
wants to purchase the software. Hence the buyer will lack the intention of opening the 
package with the legal consequence of accepting a second contract.132 Such an acceptance 
is also not seen as commercial usage.133 Even if the buyer accepts the second contract, it is 
doubtful, whether the standard terms of the license agreement inside the package are 
included. A minority states that the license terms are included.134 But the majority agrees that 
the terms are usually not validly included.135 They argue that it is necessary for the 
implementation to take notice of the standard terms according to § 2 par.1 AGBG. If the 
buyer cannot read them, their implementation would be surprising and therefore invalid 
according to § 3 AGBG.136 Instead, the legal provisions of § 69 UrhG apply to secure the 
copyrights of the manufacturer. With regard to the wording in § 2 par.1 No. 2 AGBG it is clear 
that consumer must be able to take notice of the content of the standard provisions.137 I 
agree that under German law, shrink-wrap licenses are not enforceable. This is the correct 
approach, as the consumer must be sufficiently protected against the implementation of 
terms that limit his rights. 
 
3. Consumer Protection 
Some contract provisions can be invalid, because they interfere with consumer 
protection laws. One of those laws, the AGBG, has already been mentioned. Furthermore 
there is the consumer credit act (VerbrKrG) and the law on door-to-door sales (HWiG).138 An 
important consumer protection factor is the length of the cooling-off period in view of 
cancellation rights. The situation in Germany concerning the scope of the law of door-to-door 
selling has changed after the implementation of the European directive into the distance 
selling law (FernAG)139. In the course of those changes, § 361a was implemented into the 
BGB.140 It provides the consumer with a two-week cancellation right, which can be exercised 
                                                
132 Schneider, CR 1996, 657; Köhler/Fritsche in Lehmann, p. 536; Staudinger-Dilcher, vor § 116, n. 18; Hoeren, p. 
411. 
133 Schneider, CR 1996, 657 at 659; Marly, n. 381. 
134 Moritz/Tybussek, n. 943; Schneider, CR 1996, 657 at 662; OLG Stuttgart, CR 1989, 685 at 687. 
135 Köhler/Fritsche in Lehmann, n. 39, 41; Marly, n. 381; Hoeren, n. 435; Pres, p. 185. 
136 Köhler/Fritsche in Lehmann, p. 538; Pres, p. 181. 
137 This requirement does not apply for standard terms addressed to merchants, § 24 AGBG. However, it is 
doubtful, whether the standard terms have been implied in the contract, for the merchants must have the intention 
to include the standard terms. Usually the addressee will not have such an intention. In relation to merchants, the 
standard terms of the manufacturer often imply user limitations according to §§ 18, 20, 21 GWB. Those standard 
terms must be in writing and signed, § 34 GWB, § 126 BGB. Since shrink-wrap licenses usually do not contain a 
signature, they are invalid. (Hoeren, n. 270 ff.; Busse, CR 1996, 389 at 390; Marly, n. 364). 
138 Verbraucherkreditgesetz, hereafter cited VerbrKrG; and Haustürwiderrufsgesetz, hereafter cited HWiG. 
139 Fernabsatzgesetz, hereafter cited FernAG; implementation of the EU Distance Selling Directive, 27.06.2000. 
140 § 361 a BGB is referred to by § 9 VerbrKrG, § 3 FernAG and § 1 HWiG. 
 17
18 
without giving any reasons.141  
With the implementation of the law reform, several consumer protection laws, such as 
the HWiG142, VerbrKrG143, and AGBG144 are integrated into the BGB in order to prevent 
further splintering of the law. The §§ 474 BGB new imply special rules for the contract 
between merchants and consumers. § 475 par.1 BGB new makes it virtually impossible to 
contractually exclude or limit warranties. As a result the consumer is strongly protected. This 
is positive, as standard software contracts are often concluded between vendors and private 
consumers. The latter ones are in a much weaker position. They cannot negotiate the terms, 
but can only either accept or decline to enter into the contract as proposed by the sellers. 
 
VI. LIMITATION PERIOD 
The current short limitation period for contracts of sale is another problematic 
issue.145 The limitation period for movable objects is six month from the time of delivery. This 
period was criticised, because the complex structure of software makes an examination at 
the time of delivery difficult. It seems more reasonable to apply the rules of contracts for 
works and services in § 640 BGB, which give the buyer the opportunity to examine the goods 
before he accepts performance.146 There, the limitation period only starts to run after the 
performance has been accepted. 
However this idea was criticised, too, for the courts already take the difficulties 
involved in software contracts into account. They generally agree that the limitation period 
does not start at delivery, but only after the buyer is made familiar with the program and 
testing it several times.147 Hence, there is practically no difference to the rules set up in § 640 
BGB. But this question is disputed and was not decided by the BGH.148
The reform of the law of obligations brings with it the long needed extension of the 
limitation period. The limitation period for warranties will be two years from the time of 
delivery of the object of the sale.149 All other rights of the parties fall under the limitation 
period of three years. 150 Because three years is a long limitation period, it was necessary to 
change to a subjective system. Hence this limitation period only starts to run from the time 
that the defect occurs and the claimant knows about the circumstances that give rise to the 
                                                
141 Regarding on-line contracts, the duties of the parties have been regulated in § 312 e BGB as a result of the 
implementation of the EU E-Commerce Directive. 
142 §§ 312 f. BGB new. 
143 §§ 491 ff. BGB new. 
144 §§ 305 ff. BGB new. 
145 §§ 477 par.1 BGB. 
146 OLG Düsseldorf, CR 1990, 122 at 125; LG Nürnberg-Fürth, CR 1992, 336. 
147 OLG Düsseldorf, CR 1988, 689; OLG Düsseldorf, WM 1989, 459; OLG Köln, NJW-RR 1993, 1140; OLG 
Hamburg, CR 1997, 87; OLG Hamm, CR 1992, 335; OLG Düsseldorf, CR 1991, 538; Zahrnt, NJW 1996, 1800; 
Köhler/Fritsche in Lehmann, p. 572; Marly, n. 465; Schneider, CR 1994, 385 at 389; Brandi-Dohrn, p. 78; Palandt-
Putzo, § 477, n. 12. 
148 BGH, NJW 1993, 461 at 462. 
149 § 438 par.1 No.3 BGB new. 
150 § 438 par.3 BGB new. 
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claim. In conclusion, although the limitation period starts to run from the delivery, the buyer 
will have plenty of time to test the software within the limitation period and to put forth a 
claim. The dispute on applying § 640 to the sale of software is now pointless. The reform 
brings a better protection for the interests of the buyer. 
 
VII. TAXATION 
As was explained earlier, the identity of software is also important for tax issues.151 
Software is treated differently for sales tax reasons. Sales underlie the value-added tax. 
Sales tax is imposed, if a merchant supplies something or renders another performance 
against payment.152 A supply requires the delivery of a tangible thing, including electricity, 
whereas other performances include everything that is intangible. Concerning software it is 
agreed that software sold on a data-carrier is tangible, whereas software delivered 
electronically is intangible. This has an impact on the place of performance and on the duty 
to pay sales tax. Tangible things underlie sales tax, if the warehouse from which the thing is 
sent, is in Germany. Software that is delivered electronically does not underlie this principle. 
The place of performance is the place of business or residence of the buyer.153 Hence the 
seller does not have to pay sales tax for things delivered to another country. The different 
classification of software for tax purposes is not preferable. It follows that the same products 
are treated differently, only because of the differences in delivery. For tax purposes, there 
should be a single solution no matter what kind of delivery. 
  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although the characterisation of software contracts as sales is not unproblematic, it is 
not necessary to create special regulations for software transactions. It is true that software 
is not a tangible good as it is traditionally required for a sale of goods. But the term goods 
can be stretched to imply software. It is necessary to treat software the same no matter what 
kind of delivery is chosen. Hence it cannot matter whether software is delivered physically or 
electronically. It is always the same product and must always be treated the same. This 
evolves not only from the discussion around software as the object of a sales contract, but 
also from the discussion around tax purposes. As can be seen from the discussion of the 
legal consequences, especially with the implementation of the reform of the law of 
obligations, software can be sufficiently dealt with under the law of sales. New legislative 
efforts are neither necessary nor would they bring considerable changes. The only reason to 
have new laws evolves from the need for clarity in the field of software transactions. As was 
described above most commentators and courts do agree that the rules for sales are 
                                                
151 See B.I.1.b). 
152 § 1 par.1 Umsatzsteuergesetz (sales tax statute). 
153 § 3a par.4 Umsatzsteuergesetz. 
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applicable. Furthermore the reasoning behind § 453 BGB new makes clear that the 
legislature intends to deal with software in a sales context. This makes clear that, although 





C. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Almost 50 per cent of the world’s software is created in the United States. This 
explains why courts often had to deal with the problem of classifying software transactions. 
The question how to classify software contracts was addressed as early as 1979154 and has 
since been the focal point of intense discussion in the U.S.. The law of the different States in 
the U.S. has grown from English Common Law. It follows the principle of stare decisis, so the 
law is made up mainly by precedents.155 Though contract law remains largely governed by 
common law, state and federal statutes play an increasing role. The most important statute is 
the Uniform Commercial Code156. It provides a standardised set of rules for many types of 
commercial contracts.157  
By 1999 a new statute had been drafted – the Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act158. With UCITA there is a new law designed specifically for software, the 
information industry and the Internet. It will have a crucial influence on the classification of 
software. However, UCITA must be ratified by each state to come into effect. UCITA 
changes the law on software contracts and makes it clearer. The changes will be described 
and carefully weighed against the existing UCC rules.  
 
I. APPLICABLE CONTRACT TYPE 
The UCC specifies how to interpret contracts. It defines a contract as “the total legal 
obligation which results from the parties’ agreement”.159 The agreement is the bargain of the 
parties as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances.160 If the parties 
intentions are not clear the court will have to find reasonable terms that suit the interests of 
both parties.161 While certain commercial transactions, such as the sale of goods, are dealt 
with under the UCC, others, such as the sale of land or services are not covered.162 These 
contract types are dealt with under the common law of each state. 
The different contract types under the UCC have different requirements. The sale of 
goods, for example, requires a movable thing as the object of sale, whereas service 
contracts require a service to be the major factor of a contract. As mentioned earlier, 
software is often not sold, but licensed. The question then becomes whether the Uniform 
Commercial Code governs licenses of software. Furthermore it is unclear whether the UCC 
                                                
154 Note, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1149 at 1179 (1979). 
155 Burnham, p. 42. 
156 Hereafter cited UCC. The UCC was drafted by the American Law Institute, an organisation composed of 
judges, lawyers and academics, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It was 
completed in 1952. The complete UCC has been adopted by forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands. Louisiana has only adopted Art. 1, 3-5.  
157 Morrison, p. 202. 
158 Hereafter cited UCITA. 
159 UCC 1-201 (11). 
160 UCC 1-201 (3), 1-205, 2-208. 
161 Burnham, p. 387; Morrison, p. 214. 
162 Burnham, p. 398. 
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applies if a software transaction also requires certain services. Section 2-202 UCC states 
that it is applicable to any transaction in goods. The starting point therefore is the 
identification of software as a good. 
 
1. Identity of software 
The identity of software is unclear. The legal community characterises it as good or 
as service or as something completely different from that. Art. 2 UCC deals with sales law. 
Art. 2-105 defines goods as “all things which are movable at the time of identification of the 
contract for sale..."” The term “goods” does not presuppose a tangible thing as object of the 
transaction. The essential elements are the movability and identification at the time of the 
sale. Neither Art. 2-105 (1) nor other sections expressly exclude intangible things from the 
UCC’s sphere of application. In former times courts held that intangibles cannot be goods, 
because they were viewed as personal rights incapable of delivery.163 This view has long 
been changed and it now only depends on the movability and not on the tangibility of the 
thing contracted for. Courts have even said that contracts for the supply of electricity are 
contracts for the sale of goods, though electricity is an incorporeal, intangible thing.164
 
a) Software as a good 
The prevailing opinion characterises software as a good under Art. 2 UCC. There are 
few decisions discussing the issue of software as a good. Most courts simply characterise 
software contracts as contracts for the sale of goods under Art. 2 without any dogmatic 
differentiation. Software is indirectly categorised as a good.165 The ones that dealt with the 
problem decided that software is a “good” because Art. 2 UCC must be liberally interpreted 
for a variety of commercial transactions. Goods involve all personal property that is 
transferable and identifiable except those things that are expressly excluded in Art. 2. 
Software that is transferred on a computer-readable medium automatically becomes a 
good.166 In analogy to recorded music, software is not a good, but when fixed on a tangible 
medium it becomes merchantable.167 Moreover the fixed and certain uniform laws of the 
UCC are to be favoured over the uncodified, non-uniform, common law rules that can vary 
                                                
163 Zamore v Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 at 441 (Me. 1978); Tomb v Lavalle, 298 Pa. Super. 75, 444 A.2d 666 at 667 
(1981); Horovitz, 65 B.U.L. Rev. (1985) 129 at 136. 
164 Fickeisen v Wheeling Elec. Co., 67 W. Va. 335, 67 S.E. 788 (1910); Helfey v Wabash County REMC, 161 Ind. 
App. 176 at 179, 278 N.E. 2d 608 at 610 (1972). 
165 Atlas Indus. Inc. v Nat’l Cash Register Co., 216 Man. 213, 531 P.2d 41 (1975); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v 
Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1979);  Applications Inc. v Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d 672 F.2d 1076 (2nd Cir. 1982); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 
759 at 763 (D. Ariz. 1993); Colonial Life, Inc. v Electronic Data Systems Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.H. 1993); 
Novell, Inc. v Network Trade Center, Inc., 25 F. Supp.2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997). 
166 RRX Industries v Lab-Con, Inc. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Advent Systems Ltd. v Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 
670 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
167 Advent Systems Ltd. v Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 at 675 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
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from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.168  
The fact that a computer program is copyrightable169 does not alter the fact, that once 
in the form of a disc or other medium, the program is tangible, movable and available in the 
marketplace.170 The underlying intellectual property right, such as a copyright, may be 
intangible, but software is copyrightable only if it is fixed in a tangible medium.171 The transfer 
of property is dogmatically a completely independent issue from the contract of sale. 
Personal property can be tangible or intangible.172 The transfer of property does not affect 
the initial characterisation of software as a possible object of a sales contract.173  
There is a growing judicial consensus that the UCC governs standard software 
contracts, whether they are called “sales” or “licenses”.174 Yet, some argue that Art. 2 can 
only be applied to software by analogy, since software purchasers generally do not purchase 
the software itself, but merely a license to use it.175 Nevertheless they want to apply Art. 2 
UCC, for it contains a reservoir of principles, which can be applied to software contracts.  
 
b) Software as other than a good 
In one case176, the court found that the purpose of a software license was to transfer 
intellectual property rights, not to transfer goods. Others similarly concluded that a software 
license is not a good under the UCC.177 A number of commentators have argued that 
software should not be considered a product at all. They see it as an intangible that cannot 
be squeezed into the traditional sales of goods provisions under the UCC.178 Others state 
that treating software as a good would create a “legal fiction” which places the purchaser at a 
disadvantage against the vendor.179 The purchaser does not have the key benefit required 
by the UCC, as he has no opportunity to bargain, but must accept the terms set up by the 
seller, especially when purchasing mass-marketed software. 
The download over the Internet poses a special problem. Since courts held that cable 
television programming signals are not a transaction in goods180, it has been concluded that 
electronic delivery of software cannot be a transaction in goods either.181
 
                                                
168 Advent Systems Ltd. v Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 at 676 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
169 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999) explicitly states that software is copyrightable. 
170 Advent Systems Ltd. v Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 at 675 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
171 Philips, 50 The Business Lawyer 151 at 158 (1994). 
172 Burnham, p. 449. 
173 Diedrich, 8 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 303 at 329 (1996). 
174 Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 74 (2nd Cir. 1979); Colonial Life, Inc. v Electronic 
Data Systems Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.H. 1993). 
175 Nimmer, Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1337 (1994); Murray, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 447 (1971); Rodau, 35 Emory L. J. 
853 at 901 (1986); Samuel Black Co. v Burroughs Corp. 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 954 at 962 (D. Mass. 1981). 
176 Architectronics , Inc. v Control Systems, Inc.935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
177 Berthold Types Ltd. v Adobe Systems, Inc. 101 F. Supp.2d 697 (E.D. Ill. 2000); Adobe Systems, Inc. v One 
Stop Micro, 84 F. Supp.2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
178 Bayman, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 557 at 576 (1989). 
179 Hemnes, 71 Denv. U. L. Rev. 577 (1994).  
180 Kaplan v Cablevision of Pennsylvania, Inc., 671 A.2d 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 




In my opinion tangibility must be interpreted widely. This is emphasised through the 
fact that courts even considered electricity as a good under Art. 2 UCC, even though it is 
intangible.182 Though it is true that software itself cannot be defined as a tangible, it makes 
sense to see it as a good. To be able to draw a more precise conclusion it is necessary to 
take into account the different contract forms and remedies that are available under the UCC 
and under common law. It is necessary to deal with the problem of software not only in the 
interest of identifying it, but also in the interest of finding the best legal solution for the parties 
that conclude a software contract. The different contract options will be analysed in the 
following. 
 
2. Sales Contract 
As said above, sales law is dealt with under Art. 2 UCC. Though Art. 2 UCC is entitled 
“sales”, the text itself indicates that all transactions in goods fall under UCC Art. 2. The scope 
of the terms “sale” and “transaction” have never been conclusively determined. Transaction 
has been interpreted broadly and includes several non-sale transactions.183 The fact that 
software contracts involve a license and not a sale does not preclude UCC coverage, as Art. 
2 UCC has been applied to contracts for licenses.184 As was said above computer software 
is mostly considered goods and is therefore dealt with under Art. 2 UCC without further 
discussing whether it needs to be a sales transaction.185 Some conclude that Art. 2 UCC 
applies by analogy to the terms of a software license.186
The UCC does not distinguish between standard and custom-designed goods. In both 
cases, the buyer gets a ready-to-use computer program as the final product. There is no 
difference apart from the fact that custom-designed software contracts have “specifically 
designed goods” as their object. This is provided for in Art. 2-105 (1) UCC. It is not clear, 
however, if standard software can be classified as good when the transaction involves some 





                                                
182 Fickeisen v. Wheeling Elec. Co. 67 W. Va. S.E. 788 (1910). 
183 Glen Dick Equip. Co. v Galey Contr., Inc. 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 at 1189 (1975); Hertz Commercial 
Leasing Corp. v Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226 at 230, 298; N.Y.S. 2d 392 at 396 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1969). 
184 Colonial Life, Inc. v Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 at 239 (D.N.H. 1993); Cannata, 21 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 283 at 287 (1999); Friedman 22 Rutgers L. Rec. 13 at 15(1998). 
185 Colonial Life, Inc. v Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 at 239 (D.N.H. 1993); RRX Industries v Lab-
Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 at 546 (9th Cir. 1985); Data Processing Services, Inc. v L.H. Smith Oil Copr., 492 N.E.2d 
314 at 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
186 Samuel Black Co. v Burroughs Corp., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 954 at 962 (D. Mass. 1981); Alces/Book, 84 
Minn. L. Rev. 1 at 26 (1999). 
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3. Service contract under Common Law 
Service contracts and materials used in connection with the performance of service 
contracts are excluded from Art. 2 UCC. Service contracts are governed by individual state 
contract law. If they dominate the subject matter of the contract, they bring it outside of UCC 
coverage. The common law of contract traditionally does not recognise implied warranties.187 
Hence the UCC implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose 
cannot be applied to a contract for services.188 Purchasers can only sue for negligence or 
breach of an express warranty, which requires more proof than implied warranty claims 
under the UCC.189
Transactions that involve a combination of goods and services are no novelty. Courts 
have developed a test to resolve the issue.190 The so-called predominant purpose test 
weighs two factors in distinguishing sales from service contracts: services and the transfer of 
goods.191 In other words, the question what law is to be applied is solved by determining 
which portion dominates the entire agreement. As long as a mixed contract is dominated by 
the sale of goods, the UCC applies.192  If any additional services rendered in connection with 
the contract prevail over the transfer of the software, the transaction is categorised as a 
contract for the supply of services. The contract is not split into separate goods and services 
components. 
Concerning customised software, some courts and commentators believe that the 
computer program is dominated by the service part, because the development of this 
software is a labour-intensive process requiring the skill and expertise of a professional.193 
Such contracts can be compared to contracts for the painting of a portrait or design and 
manufacture of a dress, which are traditionally treated as service contracts.194 But more 
recent decisions state that under Art. 2 UCC goods can be mass-produced or custom-
designed, they only have to be movable. So, they treat even customised software as a 
                                                
187 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes no mention of implied warranties. The Restatements are 
promulgated by the American Law Institute to distill the general principles of law in a given area from the body of 
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authority. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts was promulgated in 1979. 
188 Milau Assoc., Inc. v North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482 at 484, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882 
at 885 (1977). 
189 Horovitz, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 129 at 141 (1985). 
190 Colonial Life, Inc. v Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 at 238 (D.N.H. 1993); Design Data Corp. v 
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F.2d 543 at 546 (9th Cir. 1985); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v Natinonal Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 at 1084 (3rd 
Cir. 1980); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v Honeywell, Inc, 604 F.2d 737 at 742 (2nd Cir. 1979); Carl Beasley Ford, 
Inc. v Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 at 333 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
193 Wharton Management Group v Sigma Consultants, Inc. 1990 Del. Super., Lexis-Nexis 54 at 7 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1990); aff’d 582 A.2d 936 (Del. 1990); Micro-Managers, Inc. v Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 100, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 1375 at 1377 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). 
194 Horovitz, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 129 at 154 (1985). 
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good.195 Since Art. 2 UCC includes specifically designed goods, customised software should 
not be excluded from its scope, simply because it has been specifically designed. Art. 2 UCC 
should be liberally construed.196
When it comes to standard software, transactions often involve personal skills and 
labour, so that the contract combines aspects of both goods and services. Even though there 
might be no development component, there might be installation and training involved in the 
transaction. The question is whether they are the predominant purpose of the contract. Most 
courts decided that the service part did not dominate the contract197, since they are only 
minor duties accompanying a sale. It might be difficult sometimes to define whether the 
service components dominate the contract. But since recent cases treat customised software 
as a good, the courts will even more likely treat those contracts that only involve minor 
service duties as goods rather than services. If UCC Art. 2 allows for specifically designed 
goods, then it is clear that such contracts should rather be dealt with under the UCC. As a 
result the courts will not have to have lengthy discussions on whether software transactions 
involving certain services should rather be seen as service contracts. 
 
4. License contract under Common Law 
Most cases dealing with contract licenses of information do not refer to Art. 2 UCC or 
reject it, but rely on common law and rules deriving from intellectual property law.198 In typical 
licensing transactions, title to the intellectual property never passes. The intellectual 
components are not sold and the title to the media is not transferred. Therefore licensing of 
software does not resemble a typical sales transaction. In the context of software licenses 
some courts held that a software distribution license was not a transaction in goods, but a 
transaction predominantly focused on a license of rights.199
It is true that Art. 2 UCC does not address all questions arising in the area of 
intellectual property law. For example it gives no solution to whether a license extends to 
new technologies that emerge after the contract was made.200 It also does not address what 
default rules apply when there is no designation of the uses permitted or denied.201 It does 
not say whether exceeding the scope of a license is a breach of contract, infringement, or 
                                                
195 Advent Sys. Ltd. v Lab-Con, Inc., 925 F.2d 670 at 674 (3rd Cir. 1991); Colonial Life Ins. Co. v Electronic Data 
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both.202 However, in many ways a licensing transaction is the economic equivalent to a sale. 
The license can be granted for permanent use against a one-time fee, so that the right to use 
is equivalent to the title in the property received through a sale. In many ways a licensing 
transaction is the economic equivalent to a sale. The license can be granted for permanent 
use against a one-time fee, so that the right to use is equivalent to the title in the property 
received through a sale.  
It is questionable whether software should be treated under common law rules and 
intellectual property rules. Art. 2 UCC and common law differ significantly from one another, 
especially concerning consequential damages, statutes of limitations, and warranties. This 
affects the rights and remedies of the contracting parties.203 The UCC does permit 
consequential damages if the buyer could not reasonably have prevented the loss by cover 
or otherwise.204 Common law holds the seller liable if the damages were reasonably 
forseeable.205 Since typically some damages are forseeable in a software case, liability 
almost always arises under common law. The UCC provides a more appropriate means to 
determine whether consequential damages should be awarded. Also, common law of 
contracts traditionally does not recognise implied warranties. Buyers can only claim 
negligence or breach of an express warranty. They both require more proof than implied 
warranty terms under the UCC.206 Hence Common law lacks many benefits of Art. 2 UCC. It 
is more favourable, from a purchaser’s point of view, to apply the UCC. 
UCC and common law also differ concerning the statute of limitation. While there is a 
four year statute of limitation under the UCC, common law generally grants six years or 
longer for bringing contract claims.207 Here, common law is less favourable from a seller’s 
point of view. In conclusion the UCC is the best solution for both, buyer and seller, for it 
provides effective rules that keep both parties interests in mind. 
Common law does not provide any comprehensive rules for software either. Its rigid, 
formal rules are not adaptable to rapid change. There are no special provisions to deal with 
e-commerce. Moreover it is not uniform among the states, even within a state it is often 
scattered among other statutes and court decisions.  
In conclusion, the option to classify software as a license contract under common law 
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As a result of the persuasive arguments brought forward against the common law 
contract forms it is best to deal with software transactions under the UCC Art. 2. Even though 
software does not precisely fit into the definition of a good under Art. 2 UCC, it is in the best 
interest of both the buyer and the seller to apply it to software transactions regardless 
whether they involve a license or not. 
 
II. UCITA 
Contract law in the U.S. will be undergoing a fundamental change. UCITA is the result 
of a ten-year discussion involving the information industry, consumer representatives, the 
entertainment industry and others over the rules for electronic contracts, software licensing, 
and Internet contracts. In the early 1990’s the National Conference on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL)208 and the American Law Institute (ALI) agreed to update the UCC to include 
software-licensing agreements. Initially, a new UCC Article 2B was proposed. However there 
was a considerable resistance against Art. 2B and ALI withdrew its support. Then the 
NCCUSL proposed not to include the issue in the UCC and simply drafted UCITA as a stand-
alone statute. It was approved by NCCUSL in July 1999 and became available for 
consideration in December 1999. Since then it has been enacted by Virginia209 and 
Maryland210.211  
UCITA applies to “computer transactions”212 and covers contracts to create, modify, 
transfer or license computer information or informational rights in computer information.213 It 
contains rules for Internet-related mass-market licenses, including contracts to download 
software, access contracts, click-wrap agreements, web-wrap agreements, and electronic 
data interchange. It focuses rather narrowly on the commercial traffic in information tools, 
such as software. It is difficult to predict how broad the scope of UCITA will be in practice.  
UCITA applies to any computer information contract, regardless of whether the owner 
of the program specifically licenses it or whether he is silent on the scope of the license and 
“sells” the copy. The relationship between selling a copy of a program and retaining the 
underlying intellectual property rights has been defined. The Act covers contracts for both, 
service and goods transactions, but does not alter any rules for intellectual property.214
A contract can be made subject to UCITA, even if the transaction would be applicable 
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to a sales transaction described in Art. 2 UCC. It requires that the material part of the 
transaction involves types of goods which contain computer information.215 An exception 
arises concerning the medium that carries the computer information. It is treated as part of 
the information within UCITA, whether it is a tangible object or electronic in nature. UCITA 
applies to the copy, documentation, and packaging of computer information.216 In other 
cases, such as a computer program controlling engine timing in a car, UCITA is excluded 
because the copy of the program is embedded in and sold as part of the car as a good.217
In cases of mixed contracts, such as a contract involving the sale of hardware and the 
license of software, the sales part is to be governed by UCC, whereas the license part is to 
be governed by UCITA.218
It remains to be seen, whether UCITA will be as successful as it is hoped for. It is 
under consideration in some states, but might undergo slight changes in each of them. As 
long as the majority of states does not accept UCITA as a new law for information contracts, 
the goal of uniformity is out of reach. 
 
III. TRANSFER AND PASSING OF TITLE 
 
1. UCC 
Art. 2-301 sets forth the basic obligation of the parties to a sales contract. The seller 
must transfer and deliver the goods and the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with 
the contract. Each party must tender performance when due.219 Furthermore a sale consists 
of passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.220 The precondition to pass title is 
that the goods are identified to the contract.221 Title passes in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties, or, if there is no agreement, at the time and place at which the 
seller completes performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods.222  
Software, unlike other goods, may be delivered over the Internet without human 
intervention.223 Delivery is never physical, but can be assumed from the point when the 
software is fully loaded on the buyer’s computer. Since software is usually licensed, there is 
as a matter of federal law no transfer of copyright ownership.224 With software, the buyer 
does not gain title in the software, but he does have title in the particular copy he receives. 
The fact that licensed software does not involve the passing of the title of the software does 
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not preclude UCC coverage.225 It is clear, though, that a sale involving a license does not 
perfectly fit under the rules set up by sales law under the UCC. 
 
2. UCITA 
Under UCITA ownership passes as specified by the contract. If the ownership of 
informational rights in software is not specified, ownership passes when the information and 
the informational rights are in existence and identified to the contract. Yet, transfer of a copy 
does not transfer ownership of informational rights. Title to a copy is determined by the 
license. The right to possession or control of a copy is governed by the license and does not 
depend on the title of the copy. If the title to the copy is transferred, involving delivery on a 
physical medium, title passes at the time and place at which the licensor completed his 
delivery obligations. If the software is delivered electronically and a first sale occurs under 
copyright law, title passes in the same way.226
 
IV. LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE SOFTWARE  
A party who has not performed by the time that performance is due has breached the 
contract. The other party then has the right to certain remedies. 
 
1. UCC  
Under the traditional sales analysis of Art.2 UCC courts have required perfect tender 
in the performance of a contract. Under UCC 2-602, a buyer has the right to reject non-
conforming goods upon delivery. But usually the problem becomes evident much later, which 
is why it is almost certainly too late to exercise the rights under this “perfect tender rule”. It 
does not require the product to be perfect. It simply provides that the buyer need not accept 
goods if the goods fail in any respect to conform to the contract. Minor defects are common 
to software. It is unrealistic that software will comply with the standard set up by the perfect 
tender rule.227 Because of the complex nature of software it is necessary to establish a 
certain level of tolerance towards minor defects. It is for the seller to specify the level of 
software reliability at the time of conclusion of the contract. 
UCC 2-608 allows the buyer to revoke acceptance of non-conforming goods within a 
reasonable time if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the goods and the 
goods were accepted without discovering the non-conformity. However, again, time 
precludes most recovery. 
The UCC contains certain implied warranties that are included in every transaction. 
Warranties contractually assure customers that the products they buy will perform as stated. 
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Products normally come with an implied warranty of merchantability.228 This means that the 
merchant seller automatically promises that the product will be fit for ordinary use. The 
warranty attaches itself to a contract by “force of law”. Courts have been hesitant to construe 
the warranty in software transactions.229 Commentators argue that the implied warranty of 
merchantability should not be used for software transactions, because it is out of step with 
emerging technology.230 They argue that software is neither a good, nor is it “sold”, so it does 
not fit under Art. 2 UCC at all.231 Also, the warranty cannot be applied to software because 
the measures of merchantability rely on comparisons between similar goods. There is no 
definition of ordinary purpose of software and qualitative comparisons are difficult to make.232 
Finally they argue that the warranty stifles innovation in the industry because there is no 
meaningful standard of merchantability. If there is no standard, courts might tend to give 
preferential treatment to consumers. Producers are forced to perfect their products to prevent 
liability. Thus they are forced to curtail development of new products.233 For these reasons it 
is difficult to apply the warranty of merchantability to computer programs. 
If the seller knew at the time of conclusion of the contract that the product is intended 
for a particular use and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in his 
selection, a warranty for a particular purpose is also implied in the contract.234 In this case 
the seller does not have to be a merchant. This warranty is readily applied to software 
transactions, because the seller controls the terms of any given fitness warranty.235 It 
typically arises when a merchant buys specific goods that must be specifically manufactured, 
so it is unlikely to arise in standard contracts. If a warranty is breached by the seller the buyer 
can claim damages plus any incidental or consequential damages (i.e. loss of profit) caused 
by the breach.236  
Under UCC 2-313, express warranties can be created in a variety of ways. The 
typical form is an oral or written affirmation made by the seller. But advertisements, samples, 
and models can also create a warranty.237 A warranty usually involves a statement of fact or 
promise relating to the goods. This statement must have become part of the basis of the 
bargain. If the seller only expresses his opinion or commendation, it does not establish a 
warranty. Due to the complicated nature of software, it is difficult for the buyer to prove that a 
malfunction constitutes a breach of warranty.  
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As a result the UCC is not ideal when it comes to remedies for software transactions. 
Not only needs the perfect tender rule be modified, it also needs to be defined what standard 
can be expected from software, i.e. when it is fit for the ordinary use and what kind of 
malfunction leads to a breach of warranty. 
 
2. UCITA 
The remedies that are available under UCITA depend on the agreement. If there is no 
agreement, the remedies stated in UCITA are applicable. UCITA adopts the common law 
doctrine of material breach238 for all but mass-market transactions.239 A breach is material if 
the contract so provides or if the default rules say so.240 In case of a breach the aggrieved 
party is to be put into the same position, as it would have been in, had the other party 
performed as agreed. The concept of material breach allows for minor bugs in the software. 
This is in line with the nature of software, as it is rarely without defects. 
UCITA allows a breaching party to cure, at its expense, if it gives notice to the other 
party and if the cure is perfected promptly. 241 UCITA provides the warranties of non-
interference and non-infringement, express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability of a 
computer program, implied warranty of informational content, and the implied warranty of 
fitness for the licensee’s purpose and system integration.242 As a consequence the remedies 
are largely the same as under the UCC. But the requirements under UCITA are much better 
suited for software transactions than those under the UCC. Especially the unrealistic perfect 
tender rule is abolished and replaced by the concept of material breach. A buyer should not 
be able to cancel the contract because of a minor bug or errant line of code. 
 
V. LIMITATIONS TO LIABILITY  
 
1. UCC 
The UCC generally provides a purchaser with certain implied warranties such as the 
warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. But software contracts often 
contain provisions that are not found in other types of contracts. These are embedded in the 
license or sales agreement, especially mass-marketed software licenses. They usually 
include limitations on the warranty period, exclusive remedy (repair or replace) provisions243, 
disclaimer of express and implied warranties244, exclusion of indirect and consequential 
                                                
238 UCITA 601 (b) (1). 
239 Ring, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 319 at 358 (2000). 
240 UCITA 701. 
241 UCITA 703. 
242 UCITA 401-405. 
243 UCC 2-719. 
244 UCC 2-316. 
 32
33 
damages provisions245 and limitation on total liability.246  
 
a) Content of Limitation 
First of all, software agreements often limit the warranty period from thirty days up to 
a year. Such limitations are enforceable, unless a court finds that they are objectionable or 
unconscionable.247 Courts have generally found them to be enforceable, though not defining 
what periods would be objectionable or unconscionable.248
Agreements contain the seller’s right to cure or replace the software when it does not 
meet the contractually agreed requirements. So a supplier may escape liability because his 
only obligation, namely repair or replacement, has passed a reasonable period of time. 
Nevertheless the UCC supports such provisions249 and the courts enforce them.250
The consumer usually agrees to waive implied warranties, including the warranty of 
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose. The former disclaimer must be 
conspicuous, in writing, and mention the word “merchantability”.251 Software publishers 
routinely disclaim the warranty of merchantability.252 Additionally courts have been hesitant 
to construe the warranty in software transactions.253 The warranty of fitness disclaimer also 
needs to be conspicuous and in writing, but is only a general waiver provision, which does 
not have to mention fitness for a particular purpose.254 However, federal and state consumer 
protection laws can interfere with disclaimers so they become invalid.255
 Express warranties cannot be disclaimed but only limited in scope, duration and 
remedies. For example, consequential damages can be limited or excluded unless it would 
be unconscionable to do so. It would be unconscionable to limit damages for injury to a 
person, but not to damages for commercial losses.256 Hence it always depends on the kind 
of injury that occurs. A purchaser who is not allowed to recover consequential damages may 
suffer great economic loss, for the damages related to software failure can far exceed the 
contract price. However, it is simple enough not to make any express warranties at all. A 
manufacturer need only ensure making no affirmations, promises, or descriptions relating to 
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Then, the total liability of the parties can be limited, either by setting a monetary limit 
or by limiting it to the cap at the total charges paid by the consumer to the supplier for the 
product during a certain period of time. Hence the seller can severely reduce the amount 
recoverable by the buyer if the product fails.258
 
b) Enforceability of Shrink-wrap Licenses 
Another difficult issue is the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses and the disclaimers 
they imply. The enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses is important because it will determine 
whether recovery under UCC warranty provisions will be permitted for transactions 
conducted under a shrink-wrap license. If the shrink-wrap license is an unenforceable 
contract, the standard UCC warranties will apply and any disclaimer will be invalid. Some 
courts deemed shrink-wrap licenses unenforceable as adhesion contracts, forced upon 
consumers by seller’s with superior bargaining power.259 Others argued they were 
unenforceable because a warranty has to be conspicuously disclaimed, that means it has to 
be brought to the consumer’s attention prior to purchase. If such a disclaimer is not available 
to the customer until after the sale, it is only a proposal to modify the contract and is not part 
of the contract unless the customer agrees.260 Recent decisions enforce shrink-wrap licenses 
on the pre-condition that the purchaser has the option of receiving a full refund after 
reviewing the standard terms inside the package.261 The buyer accepts the conditions set 
forth in the license by performing the acts the seller proposes to treat as acceptance. The 
reasoning behind the decisions was that the validity of the licenses is important for the 
growth of the information technology industry, for they enable the seller to maintain low 
prices.262 The different decisions show that depends upon the rules that the court selects in 
its analysis. A court treating post-sale terms as new or additional terms to an already formed 
contract may not enforce the license agreement. If the sale is seen as conditioned to assent 
to the license agreement, a court is likely to enforce the agreement. It is more likely that the 
courts will follow the recent trend and declare these licenses and their disclaimers valid. In 
my opinion, this is the wrong trend. It does not provide enough protection for buyers, who are 
not aware of the license agreement. This is not even improved through the possibility to 
return the product after having read the terms. Often enough consumers will not read the 
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terms at all or only when it is too late. And then it is elaborate to return the product. The 
buyer should not have to carry this burden. Moreover, post-payment terms inhibit comparison 
shopping on-line, which would be an important benefit for customers when doing business on 
the Internet. 
 
c) Consumer Protection 
 Consumer statutes can also invalidate disclaimers. Consumer protection legislation 
exists on federal and state level. It is intended to provide standards to govern the form and 
content of consumer warranties.263 The federal consumer law is known as the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).264 It provides consumers with additional warranty rights beyond 
the UCC, for example the implied warranty of merchantability is not disclaimable265. The Act 
applies to written warranties on tangible personal property for personal, family or household 
purposes.266 It is unclear if software is a tangible or intangible. Accordingly it is not clear if the 
MMWA applies to software transactions, but the current trend is to recognise its 
applicability.267  
Another consumer protection law is the Federal Trade Commission rule that regulates 
door-to-door sales. In a door-to-door sale, the consumer can cancel the contract within three 
business days after it was concluded. Concerning software contracts, this cancellation 
opportunity serves little protection, as defects often occur much later.  
Under the existing laws, software manufacturers can significantly limit, if not eliminate 
any liability for damage created by their software. Through the use of exculpatory clauses 
software sellers are successful in shielding themselves from the standard of care expected 
from all other manufacturers. Often the only liability contains of the replacement of defective 
software, or payments not to exceed the original contract price. Thus, the UCC provides 
insufficient remedies for commercial software purchasers who may have to expend large 
amounts of time and money in litigation attempting to overcome well-drafted agreements by 
the seller. Even then, there is little chance to have the limiting clauses invalidated by the 
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a) Content of Limitation 
Section 406 of UCITA governs warranty disclaimers and modifications in computer 
transactions. In general it is very similar to UCC 2-316. An implied warranty can be 
disclaimed by course of performance or usage of trade. Conspiciousness is viewed more 
liberally than under the UCC. UCITA allows terms not to be disclosed clearly, so that they 
only need to be enclosed with the product.268  
 
b) Enforceability of Shrink-wrap Licenses 
UCITA addresses shrink-wrap licenses under the rubric of “mass-marketed licenses”. 
This is a standard form that is prepared for and used in a mass-market transaction. UCITA 
enforces shrink-wrap licenses, but only with limits. It does not depend on the parties’ 
knowledge of the standard terms at the time of contracting. The customer must have had an 
opportunity to review the license. This concept is important for determining whether a party 
has assented to the license. It is necessary that the terms have been made available for 
review. If the customer does not like the terms, the product can be returned and the licensor 
must bear the costs of return.269 This right belongs to individual customers as well as 
merchants. UCITA not only allows the enforcement of post-sale terms, it also permits a 
continuous change of the contract terms after the contract was entered into.270 It suffices if 
the licensor posts the changes on a web-page in order to notify the licensee.271 If the change 
is unacceptable and the changed term is material the consumer can cancel the contract. 
It can be said, that UCITA constitutes a significant piece of legislation because it 
clarifies the ambiguous views on shrink-wrap licenses. But in my view UCITA solves the 
problem in the wrong way. It might be true, that shrink-wrap licenses with post-sale terms 
enhance the growth of software products, but the growth cannot take place to the 
disadvantage of the consumer. 
Furthermore, UCITA circumvents the public policy limitations imposed by copyright 
law, as the Copyright Act allows the public to use copyrighted material for certain purposes 
without any license. Since UCITA allows the enforcement of a shrink-wrap license, it gives 
licensors more rights than they enjoy under the Copyright Act.272 Therefore UCITA 
recognises federal preemption as grounds for invalidating a mass-market license provision. 
Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which does not 
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allow state laws or regulations that conflict with federal law or federal policy.273 It also 
provides that if a term of a contract violates fundamental public policy, a court can refuse to 
enforce the contract, or can enforce the remainder of the contract without the impermissible 
term.274 The interest in enforcement must be clearly outweighed by a public policy against 
enforcement of that term. However, UCITA does not define the public policy grounds that can 
outweigh standard terms. 
 
c) Consumer Protection 
UCITA adds several new consumer protections, but is not intended to change existing 
consumer protection law. It is stated that consumer laws that conflict with UCITA control over 
UCITA.275 UCITA is supplemented by trade secret and unfair competition laws.276 Under 
UCITA a consumer is defined as “an individual who is a licensee of information or 
informational rights that are intended by the individual at the time of contracting to be used 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”. It is also provided that consumer does 
not include an “individual who is a licensee primarily for profit-making, professional, or 
commercial purposes, including agriculture, business management, and investment 
management other than management of the individual’s personal or family investments”. 
However, there is some fear that UCITA does not address consumer protection. The 
majority of the rules in UCITA can be waived or varied by the contract. That would mean that 
consumer protection provisions have no impact unless they are mandatory law. Among the 
rules that cannot be waived are those referring to fairness, like good faith, diligence and 
reasonableness.277 Also, limitations on enforcement imposed by unconscionability and 
fundamental public policy as well as any standard of care prescribed in UCITA and generally 
express consumer provisions cannot be waived. But these definitions are wide and it is not 
clear in which cases they will intervene. Therefore there should be a minimum adequate 
remedy if the remedy provided by the seller is, in effect, no remedy at all. 
UCITA characterises software transactions as license and not as sales transactions. 
One of the problematic issues is whether consumer protection laws applicable to sales of 
goods and services may be applicable to license transactions under UCITA. So UCITA 
creates doubt whether software transactions are covered by the federal Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act and state laws banning unfair and deceptive practices in sales of goods and 
services. Some argue that, if a software transaction is defined as a license transaction, a 
consumer has definitely not acquired a tangible good.278 Others state that UCITA cannot 
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alter the reach of federal consumer law.279 It is a federal question if the Warranty Act applies 
to computer information transactions. If a court were to determine that the Act applies to such 
transactions, then it applies irrelevant whether UCITA was enacted or not. Then again some 
argue that the Warranty Act was never meant to cover computer information transactions 
and therefore does not apply to software transactions at all.280  
The ones supporting UCITA argue that the costs of additional statutory consumer 
protections are too hard to bear for the market. Supplementing UCITA with consumer 
provisions that provide stricter warranties would force sellers to sell their products at higher 
cost. Hence software will be inaccessible for those who cannot afford higher prices. It would 
also lead to a decrease in innovation and competition, as increased liability will force smaller 
developers out of business.  
The discussion shows that this issue is far from being solved. It is left to the courts to 
decide upon it and it might take years of litigation and high costs to sort out the consumer 
questions under UCITA. It is clear that UCITA should have expressly stated what consumer 
legislation applies to its content and thus overrules UCITA as applicable law. Consumers’ 
interests and expectations need to be protected with more straightforward rules. Consumers 
are better off under current law, which includes the common law of contract, UCC Art. 2, 
state and federal consumer law, and federal intellectual property law. 
 
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
 
1. UCC 
An action on a contract governed by the UCC must be brought within four years after 
the cause of action has accrued, that is, when the breach occurs.281 The buyer’s knowledge 
of the defect is irrelevant. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made. It 
does not depend on the time by which the buyer acknowledges the defect.282 The short 
limitation period is often unsuitable concerning software, for defects are hard to detect and 
often only occur long after statute of limitations on the contractual claim expired. 
The software contract can imply a clause reducing the applicable statute of limitations 
to a shorter period of time, generally one year. Hence it worsens the status of the buyer even 
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UCITA requires that a claim is brought within four years after the right of action 
accrues or one year after the breach was or should have been discovered, but no more than 
five years after the right of action accrues.284 This is profitable for the buyer, as it does not 
depend on the time the breach occurred, but the time it has been discovered. The solution is 
preferable to the one under the UCC. 
 
VII. TAXATION  
The tangibility issue of software is also important for taxation purposes. In general 
states charge sales tax, use tax, and personal property tax. While software has generally 
been classified as tangible property for sales and use tax purposes285, it is not that clear for 
property taxation. Tax law requires a decision whether software is tangible or intangible. 
Most states decided that tangible personal property is taxable and intangible intellectual 
property is not.286 This is similar to the problem of classification of goods under the UCC.287  
The question of taxability of software first arose in 1969 when IBM decided to 
separate the pricing of software from the pricing of hardware.288 Since then, several courts 
held that software is tangible because it cannot exist independent from a data carrier.289 The 
majority of courts, though, decided that software is intangible knowledge and therefore not 
subject to taxation.290 They point out that software is a unique item and exclusively the 
product of intellectual effort. This is emphasised by the fact that software can be delivered by 
intangible means and can be used on a computer without any further contact with the original 
medium of transmission.  
Many states have specific legislation that deals with taxability of computer software. 
They often distinguish between operational and application programs291 or standard and 
custom-designed software.292 But whether an operational or application program, software is 
merely a set of instructions expressed electronically, so the two classes should not be 
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treated different legally. Also, custom and standard programs should not be treated 
differently for tax purposes. Hence a solution in the field of software taxation, unifying all 
software transactions, is urgently needed. 
The issue of purchasing software on-line is another problem. The Internet Tax 
Freedom Act, passed in October 1998, put a three-year ban on Internet Commerce 
taxation.293 In November 2001, a new law was signed that extends through November 1, 
2003 the moratorium on new, special, and discriminatory Internet taxes that was originally 
enacted in 1998. The reasoning behind the Freedom Act is that electronic commerce must 
be able to grow without being driven by markets or being burdened with extensive regulation, 
taxation, or censorship.294 Although states cannot make money through taxation on grounds 
of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, it is a good initiative, as it enables e-commerce to grow 
without putting any burdens on the consumers as the validation of shrink-wrap licenses does. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, UCITA is a good and necessary development concerning software 
transactions. A uniform law for software transactions has long been needed to clarify the 
rights and duties surrounding a software contract and to improve the law regarding remedies 
and limitation periods. Although UCITA lacks some rules, especially concerning consumer 
protection, it is advisable for all states to enact it. They might as well change or modify some 
of its provisions, as was done by Maryland before they enacted the Act. A more problematic 
issue is the validation of shrink-wrap licenses, which is not a favourable approach. But even 
this issue can be solved by the state enacting UCITA by changing the regulations regarding 
shrink-wrap licenses. The problem arising from that, however, is that the goal of uniformity is 
undermined, as every state would amend different parts to the original. Still, amendments are 
favourable because they bring clarification into the provisions of UCITA. 
One thing that is pitiful is that the drafters decided not to implement UCITA into the 
UCC. In my view it is better to implement changes into existing laws than to establish new, 
independent laws. The process of splitting off more and more laws results in confusion. For 
the sake of clarity of the law and to make it easier to find laws, new laws should be 
implemented into the existing ones. 
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D. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG)295 
International contracts for software may become more common with the continual 
development of the Internet. The transactions will most likely involve standard software, 
although some custom options may be offered. Buying at a distance over international 
boundaries raises issues of the relationship between the various laws in the two jurisdictions. 
The general rule is that contract parties are to have freedom of choice as to the law by which 
the contract is to be governed. Where no such clauses exist, there may be rules contained in 
a relevant international convention. Alternatively the rules of private international law have to 
be utilised to identify the appropriate national laws by which the contract should be governed. 
Assuming that the parties to a software transaction did not decide upon the proper 
law of the contract, the transaction might be governed by the rules of the Convention on 
contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). It was established in 1980 in order to 
promote international trade and exchange of goods and to provide certainty in the rules that 
govern sales contracts.296 It applies only to contracts for the sale of goods between parties 
whose places of business are in different countries.297 By its own terms the Convention does 
not apply to service contracts. The CISG is the only body for international contract law that 
has been formally adopted by the international community. However, by the time of the 
drafting of the Convention, the countries did not anticipate the impact of the software industry 
or the Internet. Hence it is silent on the issue of software contracts. The question whether 
software transactions fall under the CISG has long been discussed and still goes on. It is 
important to find out whether it is suitable to govern software transactions or whether new 
international rules are needed. 
 
I. SOFTWARE AS A GOOD 
The CISG does not specifically deal with software licenses. Art. 1 par.1 CISG requires 
the object of the contract to be “goods”. Because there is no definition for “goods”, is to be 
achieved by interpretation according to Art. 7 par.1 CISG.298 It requires an autonomous 
uniform interpretation of the word that is independent of domestic laws, but fails to describe a 
method to achieve such an interpretation.299 It is commonly agreed that it must start with a 
grammatical, systematic and historical interpretation of the wording, supplemented by a 
comparative method, considering judgments and scholarly writings from contracting 
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The different translations of the term “good” in various languages are of little 
guidance, for they all have more or less the same broad meaning and do not give any hint 
whether they include intangible things.301 When approaching Art.1 of the CISG systematically 
one must consider the exclusion of electricity from the scope of the CISG in Art. 2. However, 
this exclusion was due to the unique character of electricity, because contracts for the supply 
of electricity are often subject to unique requirements so conflicts between domestic laws 
and the categorisation of electricity under the Convention were predictable.302 Moreover the 
term “good” was intended to have a broad meaning and it can be interpreted from that, that 
exclusions must be dealt with in a restrictive way. Historically seen, “goods” and the 
application of software have never been discussed.303 Thus the grammatical, systematic and 
historical approaches prove to be unproductive regarding computer software. 
It only remains to analyse judgments and scholarly writings on the Convention in the 
contracting states. Foreign judgments have “persuasive authority”, so they are not binding 
upon other contracting states, but provide arguments and possible solutions.304 There are 
several decisions by German courts that  apply software to the CISG.305 Commentators have 
concluded that goods under the CISG are to be defined as movable and identifiable, 
separate objects.306 But it is disputed whether software is such an object. As described 
above it does not automatically fit into the traditional categories of contract law that 
distinguish not only between movable and immovable, tangible and intangible, but also 
between contracts for sale and supply of services.  
The general consensus between commentators is that the transfer of software on a 
disc should be defined as the transfer of a good.307 Since the software is embodied on the 
disc, it is movable and identifiable.308 But even though software is movable and identifiable, it 
is an intangible property that can be separated from the tangible good. It is usually copied 
onto the hardware and then the disc is not used anymore. If the software is not transferred 
on a data carrier, but transferred directly from another Computer, there is nothing tangible 
exchanged between the parties. Therefore some authors, although agreeing that the 
Convention applies to software distributed on a disc, want to exclude software distributed via 
on-line database transaction, because they compare it to electricity, which is excluded from 
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the scope of the CISG.309 Nevertheless, the majority of commentators in the contracting 
states want to apply software to the CISG.310 Software should not be treated differently from 
any other goods that have intangible properties incorporated in them. Insofar it is comparable 
to items such as compact discs, video tapes and books.311 The means of transmission is 
irrelevant. This line of thought goes along with the goal of promoting uniformity in 
international trade. If electronic software would not be applied to the CISG, then a large 
portion of international trade would be without a uniform body of law.  
Another opinion totally rejects defining software as a good.312 They reason that since 
electricity is excluded from “goods” as defined by the CISG, software cannot be included, 
because, similar to electricity, it is not an embodied object. The exclusion of electricity as an 
intangible thing really means that all intangible products are excluded from the CISG. This 
analogy is problematic, because the CISG Commentary says that electricity was only 
excluded due to unique problems linked to electricity, which were not present with typical 
international sales of goods.313
The CISG was intended to have a broad scope of application to meet the different 
legal requirements in each country. This is an advantage also for issues such as software, 
which have not explicitly been resolved under the convention. The CISG can easily be 
applied to software, as it is not even subject to any formal requirements for the formation of a 
contract. This would make it easily applicable, also, to electronic software transactions. 
Moreover, all forms of delivery have one thing in common, they all have the same intention 
and the same result, that is to transmit the program onto the computer hardware. The 
question of tangibility fades into the background. Such a broad definition also complies with 
the legislative goal expressly stated in the preamble, namely, removing legal barriers to 
international trade and thus providing the international legal community with legal stability 
and predictability. In conclusion, the wider application, that includes all forms of software 
transactions, is the better one. 
 
II. SALES TRANSACTION 
The CISG further requires that the transaction is a sale. It does not expressly define a 
sales contract, but the meaning can be established indirectly from the provisions dealing with 
the obligations of the seller and the buyer.314 Art. 30 CISG requires the seller to deliver the 
goods and transfer the property in them. The transfer of the property sold, however, is solely 
                                                
309 Fakes, 3 Software L. J. 584 (1990). 
310 Endler/Daub, CR 1993,603; Schlechtriem-Herber, Art. 1, n. 21; Diedrich, RIW 1993, 441; Karollus, p. 21; 
Zumbusch, CR 1993, 81 
311 Cox, 4 Vidobona Journal of Int’l Commercial L. and Arbitration 3 at 8 (2000); Horovitz, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 129 at 
150 (1985). 
312 Hoyer, WBl 1988, 70 f.. 
313 CISG Commentary, Art. 2. 
314 Art. 30 and 53 CISG; van Houtte, n. 4.09; Schlechtriem-Herber, Art. 1, n. 14. 
 43
44 
a matter of domestic law. The applicable rules are determined through the principles of 
private international law.315
Intellectual property rights in software are transferred by a license that is independent 
of the sales contract.316 The CISG does not specifically deal with licenses. It is difficult to 
separate these issues for the purpose of a legal analysis. Art. 4 CISG does not require the 
passing of title, but Art. 30 requires that the seller delivers the goods and transfer the 
property in the goods. This could mean that licenses, which retain title in the seller, are 
outside the ambit of the CISG. Then again Art. 41 states that the seller must deliver goods, 
which are free from any right or claim of a third party, unless the buyer agreed to take the 
goods subject to that right or claim. Hence the buyer can agree to accept goods even though 
he does not receive title in them. In conclusion the CISG allows limitations concerning the 
passing of ownership and the right to use the program, i.e. license agreements. However, 
this agreement concerns only the right to use and not the contract as a whole. Therefore 
there is no such thing as a license contract for software transactions. 
A sale must be distinguished from a supply of labour or other services that are 
excluded from the application in Art. 3 (2) CISG. If the service forms the preponderant part of 
the transactions, then the CISG is not applicable. This is generally the case when the 
software is specifically designed for the customer.317 But contracts, which involve the 
delivery, installation and operation of the object of sale, are still regarded as sales 
contracts.318 Hence the definition of sales under the CISG is rather broad and allows for 
several service factors to be included so long as they do not form the preponderant part of 
the transactions. As standard software contracts do not involve more than some service 
factors they must be defined as a sale. 
 
III. LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE SOFTWARE 
Liability arises in case of a breach of contract. There are three basic remedies: 
specific performance, damages and avoidance of the contract. In addition there is the 
suspension of performance as a remedy less severe than avoidance, and finally the 
reduction of price in case of non-conforming goods. The goods must conform to the quality, 
quantity, and description required by the contract.319 The goods must be fit for the purpose 
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for which they are normally or specifically intended.320 To receive price reduction the buyer 
must examine the goods shortly after they have been delivered and notify the seller of the 
non-conformance. Art. 25 CISG sets the standard of performance as “fundamental breach”. 
A breach is fundamental, if it results in a substantial detriment for the other party, unless the 
party in breach could not have foreseen that result.321 It depends on what the aggrieved 
party expected and if his special interests are seriously harmed. Hence remedies are not 
available for minor defects, a concept suitable for the sale of software.  
 
IV. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
 
1. Content of Limitation 
The parties are free to limit their liability by including certain standard terms into the 
contract. The implementation of standard terms is not expressly regulated in the CISG. Art. 
14 CISG generally applies to the offer of a contract and requires that the other party is 
notified of the terms and receives the terms.322 But Art. 14 CISG also applies to the 
incorporation of standard terms.323 Although the control of standard terms is outside the 
scope of the CISG324, their implementation is an element of the offer, which determines the 
content of the contract. The content can be supplemented by referring to general business 
terms.325 Since Art. 14 CISG does not lay down particular requirements for the incorporation, 
the necessary rules are to be developed using Art. 8 CISG. Standard clauses that are drawn 
up unilaterally and imposed on the buyer must be interpreted in the way that an expert would 
understand their objective meaning.326 The content of the terms underlies the applicable 
national law. 
 
2. Enforceability of Shrink-wrap Licenses 
It is doubtful whether the CISG allows the enforcement of shrink-wrap licenses. First 
of all, because the Convention does not apply to sales to consumers, the effect of shrink-
wrap licenses is more likely to be indirect. But software vendors also attempt to enforce their 
licenses on business parties. A reference to standard terms must be clear. Because the 
CISG offers the possibility to accept terms through conduct327, the buyer could simply accept 
the standard terms by opening the package. However, before accepting, the addressee must 
be able to understand the content, thus must have had an opportunity to read the content.328 
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As shrink-wrap licenses do not give the buyer the possibility to read the standard terms 
before agreeing to them, they are not likely to be enforceable under the CISG. This is also 
underlined by the Convention’s general principles, which imply to protect party reliance and 
to communicate the required information while contracting.329
 
3. Consumer Protection 
The CISG is not applicable to consumer contracts. That means it is limited to 
commercial contracts. The reason was to avoid conflicts with national consumer protection 
laws.330 However, the CISG can be applied to a consumer contract either by contractual 
choice or because the seller neither knew nor ought to have known that he contracted with a 
consumer. Also, some national consumer laws have different spheres of application. They 
might apply to commercial transactions. Therefore, consumer law provisions might interfere 
with the rules of the CISG. The national laws have priority over the CISG, as Art. 4 CISG 
provides that the CISG does not concern the validity of the contract. Whenever consumer 
law leads to the invalidity of an agreement or consumer credit legislation gives a right to 
revoke or terminate the contract, those laws must be observed, provided they apply by virtue 
of rules of private international law.331  
The non-applicability to consumer contracts is problematic in light of software 
transactions. Transactions for the private use form a large part of international software 
contracts, especially with the increased use of downloads from the Internet. It is against the 
CISG’s principle of uniformity to exclude consumer contracts from its sphere. Then again, the 
member states have very different consumer protection laws and it is not sure whether there 
can ever be a uniform agreement on consumer protection issues. Still, it would be better to 
include consumer contracts into uniform laws and to agree upon a common consumer 
protection policy. 
 
V. LIMITATION PERIOD 
The Convention does not regulate limitation periods. When the CISG was drafted, the 
New York Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods of 1974 
was adjusted to the rules of the Convention.332 But the success of the Limitation Convention 
is questionable. Not all states enacted it. Those who did not must apply their national rules 
for limitation periods.333
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Although it would be possible to include software as goods under the CISG, there are 
several exclusions, which prevent a true international uniform treatment of software 
transactions, like the exclusion of consumer contracts. Furthermore it needs to be clarified 
whether electronic transactions and shrink-wrap licenses are allowed under the CISG and 
how they should be treated. There is also no uniform body of international contract law for 
services, so software that is custom-designed is not treated uniformly as opposed to 
standard software. The CISG lags behind technological developments, leaving businesses 
and consumers to contract for computer software through the uncertainties of what state law 
is applicable to the transaction, and what determination of the contract follows from that. 
Courts usually try and transfer software transactions into existing legal traditions, if only by 
analogy. The CISG is not capable of dealing with software transactions sufficiently. Either the 
CISG needs to be modified, or a new uniform contract law needs to be drafted. But since the 
contract principles for software are underdeveloped or untested at the domestic level, one 
cannot expect to find a world law applicable to computer software. Only when domestic law 





E. SOUTH AFRICA 
Software is not specifically dealt with under South African contract law. There is not 
even much discussion about it within the legal community. South African private law is 
largely formed by Roman-Dutch common law. There are only few statutes.334 A software 
contract or a software license contract is unknown to the common law. Hence it is necessary 
to determine the nature of software contracts and to associate them to one of the existing 
contract types.  
 
I. APPLICABLE CONTRACT TYPE 
Contract terms are divided into essentialia, naturalia, and incidentalia.335 The 
essentialia form the minimum part of the agreement and indicate the contract type.336 There 
are several existing contract types known under common law, for example sales, lease, and 
service contracts. The naturalia are prescribed standard terms that apply to the contract type 
and determine the consequences of the contract type. They arise by operation of law. The 
parties can exclude certain naturalia.337 Incidentialia are specific terms that are incorporated 
by the parties.338 If a contract does not contain the essentialia of a known contract type, it is 
innominate, meaning that the consequences depend on its specific terms.339
The classification is important, as it affects the legal remedies. Under the sale of 
goods, for example, latent defects give rise to Aedilition remedies. In contrast, poor service 
only leads to cancellation and damages. 
 
1. Identity of Software 
South African law has not yet established proper rules for intangible goods. There is 
no common opinion on how to identify software. The discussion of software and its nature 
circles mainly around the question whether they can be seen as goods, as required for a 
sales contract, or if they must be seen as a service, as required for a service contract. One 
must keep in mind, that the definition of goods is very broad. It does neither require the 
object to be movable nor to be corporeal.340
It is agreed that software delivered on a disc fits the characterisation of a good, as it is 
comparable to every other good that is dealt with under a contract of sale.341 When it comes 
to electronically delivered software, the opinions are divided. Some believe that software 
fixed on a disc is a good, but that software delivered on the Internet cannot be seen as a 
                                                
334 Van der Merwe, p. 131. 
335 Rensburg/Lotz/van Rhijn, n. 181 ff.; Alheit, 33 Comparative & Int’l L.J. of Southern Africa 26 at 31 (2000), 
Kahn, p.  
336 Rensburg/Lotz/van Rhijn, n. 182; Alheit, 33 Comparative & Int’l L.J. of Southern Africa 26 at 31 (2000). 
337 Rensburg/Lotz/van Rhijn, n. 183. 
338 Rensburg/Lotz/van Rhijn, n. 184. 
339 Rensburg/Lotz/van Rhijn, n. 183. 
340 Kerr, p. 8; Kahn, p. 9. 
341 Michalson, p. 45; van der Merwe, p. 142; Tapper, p. 181; Reed, p. 43. 
 48
49 
good, as there is no physical medium attached to it.342 They draw the book comparison and 
conclude that with both software and books, the major value is the idea and not the physical 
medium. Still, books are handled as goods and so software embodied on a physical medium 
is to be handled as a good.343 Software delivered electronically should be seen as a service 
performance.344  
Others state that software should always be seen as a good, no matter what kind of 
delivery. The method of delivery does not play a major role. Electronic delivery is not 
opposed to qualify software as a good.345 This is the most important argument. It is not 
practical to divide software contracts by way of delivery and split software delivered on a disc 
from that delivered electronically. Both times the aim of the sale is to deliver the software and 
the same software is received and can be used in the same way. It makes no sense to 
handle electronic software as a service performance. In conclusion nothing speaks against 
identifying software as a good in a broad sense. 
 
2. Sales Contract 
Even if software can be seen as a good, it must be evaluated if a sales contract and 
the remedies evolving from that are best for software transactions. A sales contract requires 
that the seller undertakes to deliver possession of a thing in return for the purchaser’s 
undertaking to pay the price.346 The essentialia are the thing sold and the price.347 As was 
said above, the thing can be movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal.348 Therefore it 
seems suitable to apply the rules for sales to software transactions. 
 
3. Service Contract 
A service contract is one for letting and hiring of work. The essentialia are the piece of 
work that is let out by the lessor to the lessee against payment.349 The main obligation of the 
lessor is to finish the work. It is commonly agreed that custom-made software falls under this 
type of contract.350 It is unclear whether service factors as installation and training must be 
dealt with as a service contract or whether they can be included in a sales contract. It cannot 
be the aim of the legislator to have two contracts within one, that is one sales contract and 
one service contract for the minor service parts. Therefore sales contracts with minor service 
aspects are to be included into sales contract law.  
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4. License Contract 
There is no such thing as a specific license contract under South African contract law 
that serves as contract for both, the licensing of intellectual property rights and the “sale” of 
the software program. A license contract only concerns the relationship between the 
manufacturer and the buyer regarding the right to use the software. It does not serve as a 
contract for the transaction taking place between the buyer and the retailer. Nevertheless 
some want to fit software contracts under the term license contract. It is argued that licensing 
might serve as a form of purchasing.351 Even though licensing might not be a direct form of 
acquisition, it might serve as acquisition sui generis.352 A software transaction involving a 
license is innominate, implying that it has no applicable naturalia. Therefore it is not possible 
to associate it to a known contract type. It follows that there are no rules for the 
consequences of such a contract. This solution is not suitable. The parties to a contract 
deserve to have an idea of what legal rules apply to the contract and what obligations they 
have. In light of clarity and forseeability it is essential to fit software transactions under one of 
the existing contract forms. Since it is possible to fit software transactions under the idea of a 
contract of sale, it is not necessary to draft a new contract form and leave the parties in doubt 
as to what rules apply to the transaction. 
 
II. TRANSFER AND PROCUREMENT OF OWNERSHIP 
The common law imposes certain obligations on the parties to a contract of sale, the 
so-called naturalia. Normally, the seller must transfer the thing and the ownership in it, while 
the buyer must pay the purchase price.353  
In case of movable property the seller must transfer the thing by transferring 
possession to the buyer.354 This is easy as long as software can be physically handed over 
on a disc. It is less clear for electronically delivered software, as there is no physical element 
involved in the delivery. But in the end the buyer will have a copy of the program, whether on 
disc or on the hardware of his computer. When the common law rules of delivery were 
drafted, it was not foreseen to have something like electronic delivery. But the rules can be 
interpreted insofar, as they are aimed at the availability of the thing to the buyer, so that the 
way in which the thing is delivered is only of secondary importance. Software cannot be dealt 
with differently only because of different delivery methods. Hence the law must be stretched 
to fit electronic delivery into the rules for delivery. 
The transfer of ownership is not part of sales law, but is regulated by the rules of the 
law of things.355 A sales contract generally aims at the transfer of all ownership rights from 
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the seller to the buyer.356 Ownership passes with delivery.357 Regarding software 
transactions ownership rules collide with intellectual property rules. The software program, 
that is the idea, is only protected by copyright358, as it is an immaterial good that is not 
subject to the law of things.359 A real right can traditionally only exist over corporeal things 
that can be physically controlled. Hence a real right can exist in the particular copy of the 
software program contained on a disc or CD-Rom. Although the buyer may use the software 
on his computer, his rights to use are usually restricted by a license, so he cannot use the 
software as an owner. The problem again lies within the electronic transfer of a program, for 
the buyer does not hold a corporeal object in his hands. Nevertheless, software can be 
physically controlled. It is necessary to accept the new ways of delivery and their ability to 
transfer possession and therewith ownership. 
When it comes to the ownership in the copyright, the transfer is a little more difficult. It 
has to be in writing. But since only few software programmers would ever give away the title 
in their program, it seems unlikely that this kind of transfer will occur. 
 
III. LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE SOFTWARE 
The naturalia include the liability of the seller for latent defects and the warranty 
against eviction. Moreover the seller can give certain quality guarantees. If the software does 
not live up to them, the contract is breached and the seller can be held liable for damages in 
terms of the actio empti.360
The seller is liable for latent defects in the thing that render the it unfit for the purpose 
for which is was intended.361 Furthermore the buyer must be protected against eviction362 by 
a party that has a better title than the seller, for example when the seller pretends to be the 
owner and then the thing is taken away by the real owner. Both remedies depend on the fault 
of the buyer. Latent defects give rise to the aedilitioan actions, namely the actio redhibitoria 
and the actio quanti minoris363, but not to contractual remedies.364 The actio redhibitoria 
gives right to cancel the contract, under the actio quanti minoris the party can sue for 
reduction of the purchase price. Eviction gives rise to performance of the warranty, namely 
the payment of a compensation.365
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Latent defects must exist at the time of sale.366 A defect is defined as “an abnormal 
quality or attribute which destroys or substantially impairs the utility or effectiveness of the 
thing for the purpose it was been sold or for which it is commonly used”.367 It is latent if it 
cannot be seen or easily discovered. As was stated earlier, software is never free of defects 
and they are almost always latent. Because the courts have laid down that a product only 
has to be as functional as can reasonably be expected from it368, it can be concluded that 
software has to function, but must be expected to have some minor defects. It is difficult, 
however, to declare what defects are minor and what are major. The actio redhibitoria 
requires that the defect is serious, whereas the actio quanti minoris is always available.369 In 
conclusion the remedies are suitable for software contracts. It is for the courts to draw up a 
scheme to distinguish minor from major defects.  
 
IV. LIMITATION TO LIABILITY 
 
1. Content of Limitation 
A party can exclude or limit its liability under the contract. Software contracts usually 
include limited warranty and liability provisions in which the seller limits his liability to the 
replacement of defective software and excludes his liability concerning loss or damage 
arising from the use of the software.370 In South Africa, exclusions and limitations are 
generally allowed. The liability for latent defects, for example, can be excluded.371 There are 
only few statutory restrictions or limitations to the use of such clauses. Under common law 
there is the principle of public policy. A contract clause that is against public policy is 
invalid.372 A clause is contrary to public policy if it contravenes or tends to induce 
contravention of a fundamental principle of justice or of statutory law or if it is against public 
interests.373 But since the term of public policy is wide and its application unclear, it is unsure 
under what circumstances the courts will find a term as against public policy. It is likely that 
they will invalidate clauses only if they are extremely harsh on a party. As a result South 
African contracting parties have virtually no protection against unfair contract clauses. 
The South African Law Commission (SALC) recommended the enactment of a 
general controlling legislation for consumer protection. It proposed a system that is not based 
on public policy, but on the principle of good faith.374 Good faith is a principle that is 
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acknowledged locally and internationally. It expresses the ethical requirement set by public 
policy. A specific statute should enable the courts to control misuse of contractual freedom. 
This change is to be welcomed, as it is necessary to ensure justice between contracting 
parties. 
 
2. Enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses 
The South African position concerning shrink-wrap licenses involving terms that are 
not visible from the outside is not clear.375 Since there is no specific legislation, the general 
principles of contract law are applicable to determine the enforceability of such 
agreements.376 In general, a contract requires offer and acceptance. Acceptance can be 
made by conduct.377 The offeror can prescribe that the offer is accepted by opening the 
shrink-wrap of the package. However, a valid contract also requires “meeting of the minds”. It 
must be proved that the customer was able to notice the terms of the agreement.378 The 
customer must know about the terms. That means he must be able to take notice of the 
terms prior to the formation of the contract.379 As a result shrink-wrap licenses cannot be 
valid under South African law. 
 
3. Consumer Protection 
Limitations of liability resemble a strong bargaining position of the seller. In most 
cases the buyer either accepts the terms, or he will not be able to enter into a contract. This 
leads to exploitation of consumers. South Africa does not have any statutory provisions that 
invalidate limitation clauses in general. A few specific provisions require the inclusion some 
terms into certain types of contract in order to protect the consumer. The Credit Agreements 
Act protects credit receivers who buy consumer goods. It lays down minimum requirements 
that must be content of a contract and prohibits certain terms.380 In s.6 (1) (d), for example, 
the Act prohibits the contractual exclusion of latent defects. Yet, it is doubtful if the Credit 
Agreement Act is applicable, as software is not included in the enumeration of the Act that 
stipulates what is covered under the Act. 
South Africa also has rules for door-to-door sales that allow the consumer under 
certain circumstances to cancel the contract. The cooling-off period amounts to five days.381 
It is clear, though, that software defects will usually occur much later, so the cancellation right 
is of little use. 
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The doctrine of freedom of contract implies that both parties must hold a position of 
equal bargaining strength and that they are free to accept or reject any term of the contract. 
In today’s economy consumers are often weaker than suppliers, who hold the economic 
resources and knowledge and can impose oppressive terms on the consumer. The 
consumer of standard software must take the terms as they are or not enter the contract, so 
there is no bargaining. South African law does not provide sufficient protection for 
consumers. It is necessary to create laws that protect the consumer from being exploited by 
the seller, for example by creating an Act that deals with limitation clauses and their validity 
in general. 
 
V. PRESCRIPTION OF A TIME 
The extinction of debts by prescription is regulated by the Prescription Act382. 
According to s.10 a debt is extinguished by prescription after the lapse of a certain period. 
Debts include all liabilities arising from or owing under a contract.383 The prescription time 
begins to run when the debt is due, that is when the debtor is obliged to perform. Debts as 
obligations under a sales contract are not specifically dealt with under the Act, so they fall 
under the general three-year prescription period. This is a very reasonable period of time, 
which is suitable to protect the buyer of a software program who only finds out about a 
problem months after the sale took place. 
 
VI. TAXATION 
It is not clear where software is to be placed for tax reasons. According to s.1 of the 
South African Value Added Tax Act384 VAT is levied on the supply of goods and services by 
a vendor. Goods are defined as meaning "corporeal movable things, fixed property and any 
real right in any such thing or property“. Services are defined as "any thing done or to be 
done…“. Since software is intangible it does not fall under goods. It is not likely to fall under 
services either, because the transfer of standard software does usually not include a thing to 
be done. Therefore software could simply fall outside the scope of the VAT system.385 One 
could argue that software embodied on a data carrier can be seen as a good for tax reasons. 
But software that is transferred electronically would have to be treated as a service or fall 
outside the VAT Act. Even if it would be treated as a service, that would imply different 
taxation for the same product, as imported service is treated differently from the importation 
of goods.386 This solution is unfair. Software needs to be defined uniformly in view of 
taxation. 
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Legislation will create certainty in this area of law as far as the liability of software 
vendors is concerned. Although this development could take place through common law, the 
slow move of South African law to stretch the common law in order to fit it new legal aspects 
serves as an example that this is not the best approach. Given the serious harm both 
financially and to the person of the potential plaintiff, such an approach is not in the best 
interest of the society. Therefore it is advisable to establish a new statute that specifically 
deals with all kinds of software transactions. Such regulations could also be amended to the 
new Electronic Communications Transactions Act (Bill). In creating new regulations, it is 
advisable to take into account the ways in which other legislations solved the problem. The 
least thing would be to make clear that standard software is a good that is to be dealt with 
under sales law. Furthermore it is necessary to make clear the South African position on 





The key problem to software transactions is that they are not expressly and 
sufficiently defined and regulated. What is worse is that there is no uniform regulation for it. If 
a South African consumer walks into a shop to “buy” a software program he will not think of 
the many problems that are associated with it. It will not interest him what kind of problems 
there are with rules and uniform laws as he believes that he simply walks in and purchases 
the software, the purchase being subject to South African law. But it is not as easy as that. 
First, it is not clear if software is sold at all or if it is another kind of transaction. Second, even 
though the “sale” of the program will usually be subject to South African law, the license 
granted by the manufacturer might subject to the law of the country where it was 
manufactured. A manufacturer from the United States, for example, will make his license 
subject to U.S. law. Hence a software transaction involves most definitely elements of a 
foreign law.  
These problems become even more complicated when it comes to software that is 
delivered electronically, for example when a South African “buys” software over the Internet. 
The Internet allows modern storage and delivery methods, which makes distribution of 
software extremely quickly, at very low cost and without any regard to geographic borders. 
Here, the buyer will deal with suppliers from all over the world that will make their contracts 
subject to their national laws. So the question what rules apply to the transaction becomes 
even catchier. To confuse the issue, electronic delivery of software is even harder to fit under 
the traditional contract law rules than is software that is delivered on a disc. 
The biggest and most powerful software developers are situated in the U.S and in 
Europe. They dominate the international market. But when it comes to software transactions, 
the solutions are surprisingly different. As I explained in sections B and C, Germany and the 
United States have different approaches towards software transactions, including very 
antithetic rules for contracts and their remedies, shrink-wrap licenses and consumer 
protection. It is unbearable to have such different approaches on an international level.   
In conclusion we desperately need uniform rules in the field of software transactions. 
The special value of uniform law is that it eliminates the risk of having to litigate in a foreign 
country according to foreign law. It also lowers negotiation costs by providing terms that the 
parties can adopt freely. Uniform rules must define software and provide detailed rules for 
cross-border transactions. The question is what rules can serve as a model for a uniform 
approach. 
In order to reach uniformity, drafters should look beyond national boundaries to seek 
different approaches and solutions in commercial law. If national codes are drawing 




As was explained in section D, the only existing uniform contract law, the CISG, 
cannot in its existing shape serve as a uniform law concerning software. But some national 
laws might serve as an example of what a uniform law could look like.  
South African law is capable of dealing with software transactions, but it does not 
have specific rules. It does not provide a sufficient solution to the specific problems that arise 
from software contracts. Moreover South Africa does not belong to the leaders of software 
manufacturers, so it will probably not have an effect on the drafting of a uniform solution. It is 
advisable for South Africa to take a look at other more developed legal systems and use 
those rules as models for modernising its own law on software. 
Since the software market is dominated by U.S and European manufacturers, the 
laws of those countries are likely to have the biggest influence on a uniform regulation. As 
was indicated in the parts on German and American law in sections B and C, the national 
treatment of software is in flux. But as was explained, the new rules still lack a perfect 
scheme under which software transactions are treated satisfactorily. Since many of the rules 
are contrary, it will be a challenge to arrive at an agreement. 
German law cannot serve as a model, as it does not specifically deal with software 
and is still very focused on traditional contract law rules.  
UCITA, on the other hand, is likely to have a powerful influence on domestic laws and 
for the process in unifying software regulations. It is doubtful, though, if UCITA will be 
accepted with all of its provisions. UCITA has its limitations. It is a complex regulation and its 
rules have not been tested so far. Hence it might be too drastic for the international 
community. Even U.S. State courts will have trouble handling public issues such as 
consumer protection and intellectual property law arising in UCITA.  
UCITA’s primary safeguard of public access interests comes out of federal intellectual 
property policy, so there is a sense in which U.S. patent and copyright law apply as principles 
incorporated into UCITA, as part of the structure of UCITA. Foreign courts will probably not 
understand this use of federal law. Either they will not even recognise the possibility that an 
analysis of federal law is necessary or they will be unable to conduct an analysis because 
they are unfamiliar with U.S. copyright and patent principles.  
UCITA does not make clear how important public policy can be. Some jurisdictions 
may have their own public policy to deal with intellectual property protection. Yet there are a 
number of countries that do not have such policies.  
UCITA will necessarily lead to tension in the international context, particularly 
concerning consumer protection. Since some countries, such as Germany and South Africa, 
do not enforce shrink-wrap licenses, UCITA will not be welcomed as an international 
template for licensing software. It must incorporate additional consumer protections. UCITA 
also involves provisions such as electronic self-help, which do not exist in most countries. 
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Countries will have difficulties to adopt such provisions. 
 
At this point I would like to return to the CISG as a uniform contract law. It is clear that 
the CISG cannot serve as a uniform law for software transactions in the shape that it has 
now. However, it could serve as basis for a uniform treatment. This would be convenient, as 
the drafting process of a new law would not be necessary.  
Still, the adaptation of the CISG would call for a lot of changes. It would have to be 
made applicable to custom-designed software, that means service contracts would have to 
be incorporated into the CISG. Furthermore there are such issues as shrink-wrap licenses 
and consumer transactions that would have to be dealt with. The CISG is largely consumer 
neutral and allows countries to determine their own basic provisions with their own desired 
level of social welfare. Because there are so many different ways of coping with consumer 
protection in the signatory countries, it seems impossible to decide upon a unified consumer 
protection policy. Hence the drafting of a uniform regulation dealing with software might have 
to follow the same concept.  
The CISG would have to be stretched beyond its language to address the issues that 
come up with software transactions. This would either have to be done by the courts or by 
amendments. Interpretation by the courts will only create more chaos in international contract 
law as all countries would have to rely on international case law – a process that has proven 
difficult in the past, because many decisions are only in the country’s native language and 
they are not easily accessible. As a result many courts do not take into account decisions by 
foreign courts. Amendments and changes are the only solution to make the CISG applicable 
to software transactions.  
As a conclusion I suggest to take the basic rules of the CISG as a fundament for a 
new uniform law that is to deal specifically with software transactions and its problems. The 
CISG is a law that is accepted and applied internationally, so it is a good starting point. It 
would also be less expensive and less time-consuming to take the CISG as an example 
instead of drafting a completely new law.  
The experiences of countries like the United States and Germany will be of major 
importance when it comes to specific solutions. In certain areas, such as shrink-wrap 
licenses and consumer protection it will be necessary to find compromises, but I am sure that 
a uniform solution is possible. In the interest of all parties involved it is to be hoped that a 
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